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Thank you, Emily. And thank you to the National Association for Business Economics for the Adam Smith Award. It is an honor just to be mentioned alongside past recipients, including my predecessors Janet Yellen and Ben Bernanke. Thank you for this recognition and for the opportunity to speak with you today.

謝謝你，艾米麗。也感謝全美商業(yè)經(jīng)濟協(xié)會（National Association for Business Economics）授予我亞當·斯密獎。能與包括我的前任珍妮特·耶倫（Janet Yellen）和本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）在內(nèi)的歷屆獲獎者相提并論，我深感榮幸。感謝你們的認可，也感謝今天有機會與大家交談。

Monetary policy is more effective when the public understands what the Federal Reserve does and why. With that in mind, I hope to enhance understanding of one of the more arcane and technical aspects of monetary policy: the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. A colleague recently compared this topic to a trip to the dentist, but that comparison may be unfair—to dentists.

當公眾理解美聯(lián)儲的行動及其原因時，貨幣政策會更加有效。本著這一想法，我希望增進大家對貨幣政策中一個更為晦澀和技術性方面——美聯(lián)儲資產(chǎn)負債表——的理解。一位同事最近將這個話題比作去看牙醫(yī)，但這種比較可能對牙醫(yī)不公平。

Today, I will discuss the essential role our balance sheet played during the pandemic, along with some lessons learned. I will then review our ample reserves implementation framework and the progress we have made toward normalizing the size of our balance sheet. I will conclude with some brief remarks on the economic outlook.

今天，我將討論我們的資產(chǎn)負債表在疫情期間所扮演的關鍵角色，以及我們學到的一些經(jīng)驗教訓。然后，我將回顧我們的充足準備金實施框架以及我們在資產(chǎn)負債表規(guī)模正�；矫嫒〉玫倪M展。最后，我將對經(jīng)濟前景做簡要評論。

Background on the Fed's Balance Sheet
One of the primary purposes of a central bank is to provide the monetary foundation for the financial system and the broader economy. This foundation is made of central bank liabilities. On the Fed's balance sheet, the liability side of the ledger totaled $6.5 trillion as of October 8, and three categories account for roughly 95 percent of that total.2 First, Federal Reserve notes—that is, physical currency—totaled $2.4 trillion. Second, reserves—funds held by depository institutions at the Federal Reserve Banks—totaled $3.0 trillion. These deposits allow commercial banks to make and receive payments and meet regulatory requirements. Reserves are the safest and most liquid asset in the financial system, and only the Fed can create them. The adequate provision of reserves is essential to the safety and soundness of our banking system, the resilience and efficiency of our payments system, and ultimately the stability of our economy.

美聯(lián)儲資產(chǎn)負債表背景

央行的主要目的之一是為金融體系和更廣泛的經(jīng)濟體提供貨幣基礎。這個基礎由央行負債構(gòu)成。在美聯(lián)儲的資產(chǎn)負債表上，截至10月8日，負債方總額為6.5萬億美元，其中三類負債約占總額的95%。2 首先，聯(lián)邦儲備券——即流通中的現(xiàn)鈔——總額為2.4萬億美元。其次，準備金——存款機構(gòu)存放在聯(lián)邦儲備銀行的資金——總額為3.0萬億美元。這些存款使商業(yè)銀行能夠進行收付款并滿足監(jiān)管要求。準備金是金融體系中最安全、流動性最強的資產(chǎn)，并且只有美聯(lián)儲能夠創(chuàng)造它們。充足的準備金供應對于我們銀行體系的安全與穩(wěn)健、支付體系的彈性和效率，以及最終我們經(jīng)濟的穩(wěn)定至關重要。

Third is the Treasury General Account (TGA), currently at about $800 billion, which essentially is the checking account for the federal government. When the Treasury makes or receives payments, those flows affect dollar-for-dollar the supply of reserves or other liabilities in the system.3

第三是財政部一般存款賬戶（TGA），目前約有8000億美元，這基本上是聯(lián)邦政府的支票賬戶。當財政部進行支付或接收款項時，這些資金流動會等額影響系統(tǒng)中準備金或其他負債的供給。3

The asset side of our ledger consists almost entirely of securities, including $4.2 trillion of U.S. Treasury securities and $2.1 trillion of government-guaranteed agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS).4 When we add reserves to the system, we generally do so by purchasing Treasury securities in the open market and crediting the reserve accounts of the banks involved in the transaction with the seller. This process effectively transforms securities held by the public into reserves but does not change the total amount of government liabilities held by the public.5

我們資產(chǎn)負債表的資產(chǎn)方幾乎完全由證券構(gòu)成，包括4.2萬億美元的美國國債和2.1萬億美元的政府擔保機構(gòu)抵押貸款支持證券（MBS）。? 當我們向系統(tǒng)增加準備金時，通常是通過在公開市場上購買國債，并將相應金額計入與賣方交易的銀行的準備金賬戶。這個過程有效地將公眾持有的證券轉(zhuǎn)化為準備金，但不會改變公眾持有的政府負債總額。?

The Balance Sheet Is an Important Tool
The Fed's balance sheet serves as a critical policy tool, especially when the policy rate is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB). When COVID-19 struck in March 2020, the economy came to a near standstill and financial markets seized up, threatening to transform a public health crisis into a severe, prolonged economic downturn.

資產(chǎn)負債表是一個重要工具
美聯(lián)儲的資產(chǎn)負債表是一個關鍵的政策工具，尤其是在政策利率受到有效利率下限（ELB）約束時。當2020年3月新冠疫情來襲時，經(jīng)濟幾乎陷入停滯，金融市場失靈，有可能將一場公共衛(wèi)生危機轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)橐粓鰢乐囟志玫慕?jīng)濟衰退。

In response, we established a number of emergency liquidity facilities. Those programs, supported by Congress and the Administration, provided critical support to markets and were remarkably effective in restoring confidence and stability. At their peak in July 2020, loans from these facilities totaled just over $200 billion. Most of these loans were quickly unwound as conditions stabilized.6

作為回應，我們設立了多項緊急流動性工具。這些在國會和政府支持下的計劃，為市場提供了關鍵支持，并在恢復信心和穩(wěn)定方面取得了顯著成效。在2020年7月的高峰期，這些工具提供的貸款總額略超2000億美元。隨著市場狀況穩(wěn)定，大部分貸款很快被解除。?

At the same time, the market for U.S. Treasury securities—normally the deepest, most liquid market in the world and the bedrock of the global financial system—was under extraordinary pressure and on the verge of collapse. We used large-scale purchases of securities to restore functionality to the Treasury market. Faced with unprecedented market dysfunction, the Fed purchased Treasury and agency securities at an extraordinary pace in March and April of 2020. These purchases supported the flow of credit to households and businesses and fostered more accommodative financial conditions to support the recovery of the economy when it ultimately came.7 This source of policy accommodation was important as we had lowered the federal funds rate close to zero and expected it to remain there for some time.

與此同時，通常是世界上最深、流動性最強的市場，也是全球金融體系基石的美國國債市場，正承受著巨大的壓力，瀕臨崩潰。我們通過大規(guī)模購買證券來恢復國債市場的功能。面對前所未有的市場失靈，美聯(lián)儲在2020年3月和4月以前所未有的速度購買了國債和機構(gòu)證券。這些購買支持了對家庭和企業(yè)的信貸流動，并營造了更為寬松的金融環(huán)境，以支持經(jīng)濟最終到來的復蘇。? 這種政策寬松的來源非常重要，因為我們已將聯(lián)邦基金利率降至接近零的水平，并預計將在一段時間內(nèi)保持在該水平。

By June 2020, we slowed our purchase pace to a still substantial $120 billion per month. In December 2020, as the economic outlook remained highly uncertain, the FOMC said that we expected to maintain that pace of purchases "until substantial further progress has been made toward the Committee's maximum employment and price stability goals."8 That guidance provided assurance that the Fed would not prematurely withdraw support while the economic recovery remained fragile amid unprecedented conditions.

到2020年6月，我們將購買速度放緩至每月1200億美元，這仍然是一個相當大的數(shù)額。2020年12月，由于經(jīng)濟前景仍然高度不確定，聯(lián)邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）表示，我們預計將維持這一購買速度，“直到在實現(xiàn)委員會的最大就業(yè)和價格穩(wěn)定目標方面取得實質(zhì)性進一步進展”。? 這一指引提供了保證，即在經(jīng)濟復蘇于前所未有的條件下仍然脆弱時，美聯(lián)儲不會過早撤回支持。

We maintained that pace of asset purchases through October 2021. By then, it had become apparent that elevated inflation was not likely to go away without a strong monetary response. At our meeting in November 2021, we announced a phaseout of asset purchases. At our next meeting in December, we doubled the pace of the taper and said that asset purchases would conclude by mid-March of 2022. Over the entire period of purchases, our securities holdings increased by $4.6 trillion.

我們一直將這一資產(chǎn)購買速度維持到2021年10月。到那時，情況已經(jīng)很明顯，若無強有力的貨幣政策回應，高企的通脹不太可能自行消退。在我們2021年11月的會議上，我們宣布逐步退出資產(chǎn)購買。在接下來的12月會議上，我們將縮減購債的步伐加倍，并表示資產(chǎn)購買將在2022年3月中旬結(jié)束。在整個購買期間，我們持有的證券增加了4.6萬億美元。

A number of observers have raised questions, fairly enough, about the size and composition of asset purchases during the pandemic recovery.9 Throughout 2020 and 2021, the economy continued to face significant challenges as successive waves of COVID caused widespread disruption and loss. During that tumultuous period, we continued purchases in order to avoid a sharp, unwelcome tightening of financial conditions at a time when the economy still appeared to be highly vulnerable. Our thinking was informed by recent episodes in which signals about reducing the balance sheet had triggered significant tightening in financial conditions. We were thinking of events of December 2018, as well as the 2013 "taper tantrum."10

一些觀察人士對疫情恢復期間資產(chǎn)購買的規(guī)模和構(gòu)成提出了相當合理的疑問。? 在整個2020年和2021年，隨著一波又一波的新冠疫情造成廣泛的破壞和損失，經(jīng)濟持續(xù)面臨重大挑戰(zhàn)。在那個動蕩時期，我們繼續(xù)進行購買，以避免在經(jīng)濟似乎仍然非常脆弱的時候出現(xiàn)急劇且不受歡迎的金融條件收緊。我們的想法受到了近期一些事件的啟發(fā)，在這些事件中，有關縮減資產(chǎn)負債表的信號曾引發(fā)了金融條件的顯著收緊。我們想到的是2018年12月的事件，以及2013年的“縮減恐慌”。1?

Regarding the composition of our purchases, some have questioned the inclusion of agency MBS purchases given the strong housing market during the pandemic recovery.11 Outside of purchases aimed specifically at market functioning, MBS purchases are primarily intended, like our purchases of Treasury securities, to ease broader financial conditions when the policy rate is constrained at the ELB.12 The extent to which these MBS purchases disproportionately affected housing market conditions during this period is challenging to determine. Many factors affect the mortgage market, and many factors beyond the mortgage market affect supply and demand in the broader housing market.13

關于我們購買的構(gòu)成，一些人質(zhì)疑在疫情恢復期間房地產(chǎn)市場強勁的情況下，為何要購買機構(gòu)MBS。11 除了專門針對市場功能的購買外，MBS購買的主要目的，與我們購買國債一樣，是在政策利率受有效利率下限（ELB）約束時，放寬更廣泛的金融條件。12 在此期間，這些MBS購買在多大程度上對房地產(chǎn)市場狀況產(chǎn)生了不成比例的影響，是難以確定的。許多因素影響抵押貸款市場，而抵押貸款市場之外的許多因素也影響著更廣泛的房地產(chǎn)市場的供需。13

With the clarity of hindsight, we could have—and perhaps should have—stopped asset purchases sooner. Our real-time decisions were intended to serve as insurance against downside risks. We knew that we could unwind purchases relatively quickly once we ended them, which is exactly what we did. Research and experience tell us that asset purchases affect the economy through expectations regarding the future size and duration of our balance sheet.14 When we announced our taper, market participants began pricing in its effects, pulling forward the tightening in financial conditions.15 Stopping sooner could have made some difference, but not likely enough to fundamentally alter the trajectory of the economy. Nonetheless, our experience since 2020 does suggest that we can be more nimble in our use of the balance sheet, and more confident that our communications will foster appropriate expectations among market participants given their growing experience with these tools.

事后看來，我們本可以——或許也應該——更早停止資產(chǎn)購買。我們當時的實時決策旨在作為防范下行風險的保險。我們知道，一旦停止購買，我們可以相對迅速地解除它們，而這也正是我們所做的。研究和經(jīng)驗告訴我們，資產(chǎn)購買通過對我們資產(chǎn)負債表未來規(guī)模和持續(xù)時間的預期來影響經(jīng)濟。1? 當我們宣布縮減購債時，市場參與者開始計入其影響，從而提前了金融條件的收緊。1? 更早停止購買可能會產(chǎn)生一些影響，但可能不足以從根本上改變經(jīng)濟的軌跡。盡管如此，我們自2020年以來的經(jīng)驗確實表明，我們可以更靈活地使用資產(chǎn)負債表，并且更有信心，鑒于市場參與者對這些工具的經(jīng)驗日益豐富，我們的溝通將能培養(yǎng)他們形成適當?shù)念A期。

Some have also argued that we could have better explained the purpose of asset purchases in real time.16 There is always room for improved communication. But I believe our statements were reasonably clear about our objectives, which were to support and then sustain smooth market functioning and to help foster accommodative financial conditions. Over time, the relative importance of those objectives evolved with economic conditions. But the objectives were never in conflict, so at the time this issue appeared to be a distinction without much of a difference. That is not always the case, of course. For example, the March 2023 banking stress led to a sizable increase in our balance sheet through lending operations. We clearly differentiated these financial stability operations from our monetary policy stance. Indeed, we continued to raise the policy rate through that time.

一些人還認為，我們本可以在當時更好地解釋資產(chǎn)購買的目的。1? 溝通總有改進的空間。但我相信，我們的聲明對于我們的目標是相當清晰的，即支持并維持市場的平穩(wěn)運行，以及幫助營造寬松的金融環(huán)境。隨著時間的推移，這些目標的相對重要性隨著經(jīng)濟狀況而演變。但這些目標從未沖突，所以在當時，這個問題似乎只是一個沒有太大區(qū)別的細微差別。當然，情況并非總是如此。例如，2023年3月的銀行業(yè)壓力導致我們的資產(chǎn)負債表通過貸款操作大幅增加。我們明確區(qū)分了這些旨在維護金融穩(wěn)定的操作與我們的貨幣政策立場。事實上，在那段時間里，我們繼續(xù)提高了政策利率。

Our Ample Reserves Framework Works Well
Turning to my second topic, our ample reserves regime has proven highly effective, delivering good control of our policy rate across a wide range of challenging economic conditions, while promoting financial stability and supporting a resilient payments system.17

我們的充足準備金框架運作良好
轉(zhuǎn)向我的第二個話題，我們的充足準備金制度已被證明非常有效，在各種充滿挑戰(zhàn)的經(jīng)濟條件下，都實現(xiàn)了對我們政策利率的良好控制，同時促進了金融穩(wěn)定并支持了一個有彈性的支付體系。1?

In this framework, an ample supply of reserves ensures adequate liquidity in the banking system, and control of our policy rate is achieved through the setting of our administered rates—interest on reserve balances and the overnight reverse repo rate. This approach allows us to maintain rate control independently of the size of our balance sheet. That is important given large, unpredictable swings in liquidity demand from the private sector and significant fluctuations in autonomous factors affecting reserve supply, such as the Treasury General Account.

在這個框架下，充足的準備金供應確保了銀行體系內(nèi)有足夠的流動性，而對我們政策利率的控制是通過設定我們的管理利率——準備金余額利息和隔夜逆回購利率——來實現(xiàn)的。這種方法使我們能夠在控制利率的同時，不受資產(chǎn)負債表規(guī)模的影響。考慮到私營部門流動性需求的巨大且不可預測的波動，以及影響準備金供應的自主性因素（如財政部一般賬戶）的顯著波動，這一點非常重要。

This framework has proven resilient whether the balance sheet is shrinking or growing. Since June 2022, we have reduced the size of our balance sheet by $2.2 trillion—from 35 percent to just under 22 percent of GDP—while maintaining effective interest rate control.18

無論資產(chǎn)負債表是收縮還是擴張，這個框架都顯示出了韌性。自2022年6月以來，我們已將資產(chǎn)負債表規(guī)�？s減了2.2萬億美元——從占GDP的35%降至不足22%——同時保持了有效的利率控制。1?

Our long-stated plan is to stop balance sheet runoff when reserves are somewhat above the level we judge consistent with ample reserve conditions.19 We may approach that point in coming months, and we are closely monitoring a wide range of indicators to inform this decision.20 Some signs have begun to emerge that liquidity conditions are gradually tightening, including a general firming of repo rates along with more noticeable but temporary pressures on selected dates. The Committee's plans lay out a deliberately cautious approach to avoid the kind of money market strains experienced in September 2019. Moreover, the tools of our implementation framework, including the standing repo facility and the discount window, will help contain funding pressures and keep the federal funds rate within our target range through this transition to lower reserve levels.

我們長期以來的計劃是，當準備金水平略高于我們判斷與充足準備金條件相符的水平時，停止縮減資產(chǎn)負債表。1? 我們可能在未來幾個月接近這一點，并且我們正在密切監(jiān)測一系列廣泛的指標來為這一決策提供信息。2? 一些跡象已經(jīng)開始出現(xiàn)，表明流動性狀況正在逐步收緊，包括回購利率的普遍走強，以及在特定日期出現(xiàn)的更明顯但暫時的壓力。委員會的計劃制定了一個審慎的方法，以避免出現(xiàn)2019年9月那樣的貨幣市場緊張狀況。此外，我們實施框架的工具，包括常備回購便利和貼現(xiàn)窗口，將有助于遏制融資壓力，并在此向較低準備金水平過渡的過程中，將聯(lián)邦基金利率保持在我們的目標區(qū)間內(nèi)。

Normalizing the size of our balance sheet does not mean going back to the balance sheet we had before the pandemic. In the longer run, the size of our balance sheet is determined by the public's demand for our liabilities rather than our pandemic-related asset purchases. Non-reserve liabilities currently stand about $1.1 trillion higher than just prior to the pandemic, thus requiring that our securities holdings be equally higher. Demand for reserves has risen as well, in part reflecting the growth of the banking system and the overall economy.

資產(chǎn)負債表規(guī)模正常化并不意味著回到疫情前的資產(chǎn)負債表。從長遠來看，我們資產(chǎn)負債表的規(guī)模是由公眾對我們負債的需求決定的，而不是由我們與疫情相關的資產(chǎn)購買決定的。目前，非準備金負債比疫情前高出約1.1萬億美元，因此要求我們持有的證券也要相應增加。對準備金的需求也有所上升，部分反映了銀行體系和整體經(jīng)濟的增長。

Regarding the composition of our securities portfolio, relative to the outstanding universe of Treasury securities, our portfolio is currently overweight longer-term securities and underweight shorter-term securities. The longer-run composition will be a topic of Committee discussion. Transition to our desired composition will occur gradually and predictably, giving market participants time to adjust and minimizing the risk of market disruption. Consistent with our longstanding guidance, we aim for a portfolio consisting primarily of Treasury securities over the longer run.21

關于我們證券投資組合的構(gòu)成，相對于已發(fā)行的國債總量，我們的投資組合目前超配長期證券，低配短期證券。長期的構(gòu)成將是委員會討論的一個議題。向我們期望的構(gòu)成過渡將是漸進和可預測的，給予市場參與者調(diào)整的時間，并最大限度地降低市場擾動的風險。根據(jù)我們長期的指引，我們的目標是在長期內(nèi)持有一個主要由國債構(gòu)成的投資組合。21

Some have questioned whether the interest we pay on reserves is costly to taxpayers. In fact, that is not the case. The Fed earns interest income from the Treasury securities that back reserves. Most of the time, our interest earnings from Treasury holdings more than cover the interest paid on reserves, generating significant remittances to the Treasury. By law, we remit all profits to the Treasury after covering expenses. Since 2008, even after accounting for the recent period of negative net income, our total remittances to Treasury have totaled more than $900 billion. While our net interest income has temporarily been negative due to the rapid rise in policy rates to control inflation, this is highly unusual. Our net income will soon turn positive again, as it typically has been throughout our history. Of course, having negative net income has no bearing on our ability to conduct monetary policy or meet our financial obligations.22

一些人質(zhì)疑我們支付給準備金的利息是否會給納稅人帶來成本。事實上，情況并非如此。美聯(lián)儲從支持準備金的國債中獲得利息收入。在大多數(shù)時候，我們從國債持有中獲得的利息收入足以覆蓋支付給準備金的利息，從而為財政部帶來可觀的上繳利潤。根據(jù)法律，我們在扣除開支后將所有利潤上繳給財政部。自2008年以來，即使考慮到近期凈收入為負的時期，我們向財政部上繳的總額也超過了9000億美元。雖然由于為控制通脹而迅速提高政策利率，我們的凈利息收入暫時為負，但這是非常不尋常的。我們的凈收入很快將再次轉(zhuǎn)正，正如我們歷史上通常的情況一樣。當然，凈收入為負對我們執(zhí)行貨幣政策或履行財務義務的能力沒有影響。22

If our ability to pay interest on reserves and other liabilities were eliminated, the Fed would lose control over rates. The stance of monetary policy would no longer be appropriately calibrated to economic conditions and would push the economy away from our employment and price stability goals. To restore rate control, large sales of securities over a short period of time would be needed to shrink our balance sheet and the quantity of reserves in the system. The volume and speed of these sales could strain Treasury market functioning and compromise financial stability. Market participants would need to absorb the sales of Treasury securities and agency MBS, which would put upward pressure on the entire yield curve, raising borrowing costs for the Treasury and the private sector. Even after that volatile and disruptive process, the banking system would be less resilient and more vulnerable to liquidity shocks.

如果我們支付準備金和其他負債利息的能力被取消，美聯(lián)儲將失去對利率的控制。貨幣政策的立場將不再能根據(jù)經(jīng)濟狀況進行適當校準，并將使經(jīng)濟偏離我們的就業(yè)和價格穩(wěn)定目標。為了恢復利率控制，將需要在短時間內(nèi)大規(guī)模出售證券，以縮減我們的資產(chǎn)負債表和系統(tǒng)中的準備金數(shù)量。這些出售的數(shù)量和速度可能會給國債市場運作帶來壓力，并損害金融穩(wěn)定。市場參與者將需要吸收出售的國債和機構(gòu)MBS，這將對整個收益率曲線施加上行壓力，提高財政部和私營部門的借貸成本。即使在那個動蕩和破壞性的過程之后，銀行體系的韌性也會減弱，更容易受到流動性沖擊的影響。

The bottom line is that our ample reserves regime has proven remarkably effective for implementing monetary policy and supporting economic and financial stability.

總而言之，我們的充足準備金制度在實施貨幣政策以及支持經(jīng)濟和金融穩(wěn)定方面，已被證明非常有效。

Current Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy Outlook
I will close with a brief discussion of the economy and the outlook for monetary policy. Although some important government data have been delayed due to the shutdown, we routinely review a wide variety of public- and private-sector data that have remained available. We also maintain a nationwide network of contacts through the Reserve Banks who provide valuable insights, which will be summarized in tomorrow's Beige Book.

當前經(jīng)濟狀況與貨幣政策展望
最后，我將簡要討論經(jīng)濟和貨幣政策的前景。盡管由于政府停擺，一些重要的政府數(shù)據(jù)被延遲發(fā)布，但我們例行審查了各種仍然可用的公共和私營部門數(shù)據(jù)。我們還通過各儲備銀行維持著一個全國性的聯(lián)系網(wǎng)絡，他們提供了寶貴的見解，這些見解將在明天的褐皮書（Beige Book）中進行總結(jié)。

Based on the data that we do have, it is fair to say that the outlook for employment and inflation does not appear to have changed much since our September meeting four weeks ago. Data available prior to the shutdown, however, show that growth in economic activity may be on a somewhat firmer trajectory than expected.

根據(jù)我們確實擁有的數(shù)據(jù)，可以公平地說，自四周前我們九月份的會議以來，就業(yè)和通脹的前景似乎沒有太大變化。然而，在政府停擺前可獲得的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，經(jīng)濟活動的增長軌跡可能比預期的要稍微強勁一些。

While the unemployment rate remained low through August, payroll gains have slowed sharply, likely in part due to a decline in labor force growth due to lower immigration and labor force participation. In this less dynamic and somewhat softer labor market, the downside risks to employment appear to have risen. While official employment data for September are delayed, available evidence suggests that both layoffs and hiring remain low, and that both households' perceptions of job availability and firms' perceptions of hiring difficulty continue their downward trajectories.23

盡管截至八月份失業(yè)率保持在低位，但新增就業(yè)人數(shù)已急劇放緩，部分原因可能是由于移民減少和勞動力參與率下降導致勞動力增長放緩。在這個活力減弱、略顯疲軟的勞動力市場中，就業(yè)的下行風險似乎有所增加。雖然九月份的官方就業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)被延遲發(fā)布，但現(xiàn)有證據(jù)表明，裁員和招聘活動都保持在低水平，并且家庭對工作機會的看法和企業(yè)對招聘難度的看法都繼續(xù)呈下降趨勢。23

Meanwhile, 12-month core PCE inflation was 2.9 percent in August, up slightly from earlier this year, as rising core goods inflation has outpaced continued disinflation in housing services. Available data and surveys continue to show that goods price increases primarily reflect tariffs rather than broader inflationary pressures. Consistent with these effects, near-term inflation expectations have generally increased this year, while most longer-term expectation measures remain aligned with our 2 percent goal.

與此同時，八月份的12個月核心個人消費支出（PCE）通脹率為2.9%，比今年早些時候略有上升，因為核心商品通脹的上漲超過了住房服務業(yè)的持續(xù)通縮�，F(xiàn)有數(shù)據(jù)和調(diào)查繼續(xù)顯示，商品價格上漲主要反映了關稅的影響，而非更廣泛的通脹壓力。與這些影響相一致，近期的通脹預期今年普遍上升，而大多數(shù)長期預期指標仍與我們2%的目標保持一致。

Rising downside risks to employment have shifted our assessment of the balance of risks. As a result, we judged it appropriate to take another step toward a more neutral policy stance at our September meeting. There is no risk-free path for policy as we navigate the tension between our employment and inflation goals. This challenge was evident in the dispersion of Committee participants' projections at the September meeting. I will stress again that these projections should be understood as representing a range of potential outcomes whose probabilities evolve as new information informs our meeting-by-meeting approach to policymaking. We will set policy based on the evolution of the economic outlook and the balance of risks, rather than following a predetermined path.

就業(yè)下行風險的上升改變了我們對風險平衡的評估。因此，在我們九月份的會議上，我們認為采取進一步措施，向更中性的政策立場邁進是適當?shù)摹Ｔ谖覀兣ζ胶饩蜆I(yè)和通脹目標之間的緊張關系時，不存在無風險的政策路徑。這一挑戰(zhàn)在九月份會議上委員會參與者預測的分散性中顯而易見。我將再次強調(diào)，這些預測應被理解為代表了一系列可能的結(jié)果，其概率會隨著新信息為我們逐次會議的決策方法提供依據(jù)而演變。我們將根據(jù)經(jīng)濟前景的演變和風險的平衡來制定政策，而不是遵循預設的路徑。

Thank you again for this award and for inviting me to join you today. I look forward to our conversation.

再次感謝你們授予我這個獎項，并邀請我今天參加活動。我期待著我們的對話。