“His people don’t know what they’re doing or what they want”

“他的團(tuán)隊(duì)不知道該做什么！需要什么！”

4月16日， 諾獎經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家保羅·克魯格曼在 Substack平臺發(fā)表文章，批評特朗普近期出臺的關(guān)于貿(mào)易、關(guān)稅等一系列政策，并且預(yù)測特朗普政府會輸?shù)襞c中國的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。

保羅·克魯格曼（Paul R. Krugman）， 美國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。 2008年獲諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎。克魯格曼的主要研究領(lǐng)域包括國際貿(mào)易、國際金融、貨幣危機(jī)與匯率變化理論。

在文章中，克魯格曼認(rèn)為懂王和他的團(tuán)隊(duì)根本就不懂國際貿(mào)易，開門見山直述核心邏輯——國際貿(mào)易的核心不在于什么你能賣，而是你能買到什么。

克魯格曼功成名就的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究方向是國際貿(mào)易，也算是偏向自由派的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)專家，他就不可能和川王尿一壺里嗎？

克魯格曼對于川王的“U.S. Plans to Use Trade Negotiations to Isolate China.”——“貿(mào)易談判孤立中國的計(jì)劃”，并不認(rèn)為這個(gè)計(jì)劃能夠成功。他給出了四個(gè)原因，我以自己的理解簡要?dú)w納羅列：

1、政治兒戲化，通過社交媒體發(fā)布政策，前后不一致或自我否定。

2、孤立中國非一國之力，需要它國同進(jìn)退，但川王政府讓美國國際聲譽(yù)落地，人家未必跟隨。

3、即便川王可信，從自身利益角度出發(fā)，歐盟也不會得罪中國破壞自己的供應(yīng)鏈。

4、交易的核心在進(jìn)口而非出口，出口的損失中國政府可以通過擴(kuò)大內(nèi)需彌補(bǔ)，但美國損失的關(guān)鍵進(jìn)口品卻很難彌補(bǔ)。同時(shí)，有一方不用面臨選舉的壓力。

所以，克魯格曼認(rèn)為，川王對抗中國是蚍蜉撼樹，不對稱的戰(zhàn)爭

而更深層次的，克魯格曼從制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度，闡述了美國為什么在世界范圍內(nèi)失去信任，是因?yàn)槟壳?strong>美國的政治制度正在邁向獨(dú)裁，這個(gè)世界上廣泛的民主體制價(jià)值觀，背道而馳。因此現(xiàn)在沒有國家愿意和美國結(jié)盟。

所以，文章段末的“collapse of democracy”并不是指民主制度本身的崩塌，而是指的美國的政治制度正在轉(zhuǎn)向。

當(dāng)然，克魯格曼本身就是一個(gè)“大喇叭”，對于貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，他不看好川王政府，并不意味著他就看好中國。比如去年他也發(fā)表了一篇文章“唱空”中國經(jīng)濟(jì)，認(rèn)為中國經(jīng)濟(jì)模式不可持續(xù)，尤其是高投資帶動的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，未來應(yīng)該轉(zhuǎn)型為以消費(fèi)為主的模式。

他也曾經(jīng)寫文章質(zhì)疑過中國經(jīng)濟(jì)的未來發(fā)展：

“中國經(jīng)濟(jì)面對目前的困境，最顯而易見的解決辦法是將更多收入轉(zhuǎn)移到家庭，從生產(chǎn)端轉(zhuǎn)移到消費(fèi)端，增加居民收入從而增強(qiáng)消費(fèi)需求。 但中國似乎奇怪地不愿做這些顯而易見的事情，仍然專注于大量生產(chǎn)而非消費(fèi) 。 ”

當(dāng)時(shí)，國內(nèi)也有很多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)專家批評他，其實(shí)平心而論，他對于中國的看法和預(yù)測，更多是基于他的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理念，而非政治身份和意識形態(tài)。甚至關(guān)于中國經(jīng)濟(jì)在投資和消費(fèi)方面的，其實(shí)也是有一定的邏輯和道理。

因此，我們可以通過克魯格曼的這篇文章，從第三方的視角，來審視這場由特朗普發(fā)起的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)“鬧劇”的未來走勢。

以下，為英文原文及翻譯：

Scenes from the trade war:

In response to Donald Trump’s huge tariffs on Chinese exports, China’s government has suspended exports of rare earth minerals and magnets, both critical to many modern industries and the military

Trade talks between the United States and the European Union appear to have gone nowhere, with Maros Sefcovic, the EU’s top trade official, reportedly having “struggled to determine America’s aims.”

貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的場景：

針對唐納德·特朗普對中國出口商品征收高額關(guān)稅，中國政府已暫停出口稀土礦物和磁鐵，這兩種物質(zhì)對眾多現(xiàn)代產(chǎn)業(yè)和軍事領(lǐng)域都至關(guān)重要。

據(jù)報(bào)道，美國和歐盟之間的貿(mào)易談判似乎毫無進(jìn)展，歐盟首席貿(mào)易官員馬羅什·謝夫喬維奇“難以確定美國的目標(biāo)”。

In other words, the Chinese, unlike the Trump administration, understand what trade and trade wars are about. And the Trumpers, in addition to not knowing what they’re doing, don’t even know what they want.

換句話說，中國與特朗普政府不同，他們明白貿(mào)易以及貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)是怎么回事。而特朗普政府除了不知道自己在做什么之外，甚至都不清楚自己想要什么。

Here’s what Trump and his sycophants don’t understand about international trade: It’s not about what you can sell, it’s about what you can buy.

特朗普及其他的馬屁精，對國際貿(mào)易一竅不通：國際貿(mào)易的核心邏輯不在于你能賣什么，而在于你能買什么。

Think for a minute about the finances of individuals. Why do people work? Not to be able to boast that they ran trade surpluses with their employers — “Hey, they paid me a lot, and I hardly bought anything from them.” No, people sell their labor so that they can afford to buy stuff.

思考一下我們的個(gè)人財(cái)務(wù)。人們?yōu)槭裁匆ぷ髂?？不是為了吹噓自己作為勞動者和老板之間的“貿(mào)易順差”——“嘿，老板們付給了我相當(dāng)多的薪酬，然而我們卻沒有從他們那里買任何東西”。人們出售自己的勞動力，是為了購買商品。

The same is true for countries. Importing what you want — being able to get stuff from other countries — is the purpose of international trade. Exporting — sending stuff to other countries — is something we do so we can pay for imports.

國家之間的道理同樣如此。進(jìn)口你所需要的——能夠從其他國家購買商品——這是國際貿(mào)易的目的。出口——賣給其他國家（得到外匯）——這樣我們才能夠購買進(jìn)口商品。

OK, in practice there’s a bit more to the story, as I’ll explain below, but the complications don’t change the fundamental proposition that the benefits from international trade basically come from being able to import goods that would be expensive or impossible to produce at home. Think hydroelectric power from Canada.

當(dāng)然，現(xiàn)實(shí)中的貿(mào)易比理論要復(fù)雜，我將在下文進(jìn)行的解釋。然而，不管再復(fù)雜，其基本邏輯是沒有變的，即國際貿(mào)易的好處是，能夠進(jìn)口昂貴，或者是不能在國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)的商品。 想想來自加拿大的水力發(fā)電。

This fundamental reality explains why serious analyses of Trump’s trade war with China often conclude that China, not America, has the upper hand.

這一基本現(xiàn)實(shí)解釋了，為什么那些關(guān)于特朗普與中國的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的嚴(yán)肅分析，往往得出的結(jié)論是，中國，而不是美國，占了上風(fēng)。

Yesterday the Financial Times had a mostly good writeup of the stakes, which pointed out that US exports to China are “heavily focused on agriculture.” The FT said that these goods are “l(fā)ow value-added,” which I’m not sure is true — U.S. farming is highly productive and highly capital-intensive. But what matters in a trade war is the fact that China can fairly easily find other agricultural suppliers, buying soybeans from Brazil instead of Iowa.

昨天，《金融時(shí)報(bào)》對利害關(guān)系進(jìn)行了大量報(bào)道，指出美國對中國的出口“主要集中在農(nóng)業(yè)上”。 英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》表示，這些商品是“低附加值”的，我不確定這是真的——美國農(nóng)業(yè)生產(chǎn)力高，資本密集型高。 但在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，重要的是，中國可以很容易地找到其他農(nóng)業(yè)供應(yīng)商，從巴西購買大豆替代從愛荷華州。

By contrast, the United States will have a hard time replacing many of the goods it imports from China. Furthermore, many of the goods we buy from China are industrial inputs rather than consumer goods.

相比之下，美國將很難找到原本從中國進(jìn)口商品的替代品。 此外，我們從中國購買的許多商品都是工業(yè)投入，而不是消費(fèi)品。

So Trump has started a trade war that will disrupt our own supply chains. Remember Covid and its immediate aftermath? Remember how shortages spread through the economy and fueled inflation? Those days are about to come back, inflicting especially large damage on the manufacturing sector Trump claims he will revive.

因此，特朗普發(fā)動了一場貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，這將擾亂我們自己的供應(yīng)鏈。還記得新冠肺炎及其直接后果嗎？ 還記得短缺是如何在經(jīng)濟(jì)中蔓延和助長通貨膨脹的嗎？ 那些日子即將卷土重來，尤其是對特朗普聲稱他將復(fù)興的制造業(yè)，將造成了特別大的損害。

Is the U.S. economy at China’s mercy? No. America remains a highly productive nation that could cope with even severe economic shocks if it had smart, clear-headed leadership. But we don’t.

美國經(jīng)濟(jì)受中國擺布嗎？不。美國仍然是一個(gè)生產(chǎn)力強(qiáng)國，甚至能夠應(yīng)對嚴(yán)重的經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊。但前提是這個(gè)國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者具備聰明、清醒的頭腦。但我們沒有。

True, today’s Wall Street Journal has an article with the headline “U.S. Plans to Use Trade Negotiations to Isolate China.” So you might think that there’s an actual strategy out there. But I don’t believe it, for four reasons.

誠然，今天的《華爾街日報(bào)》有一篇標(biāo)題為“美國計(jì)劃利用貿(mào)易談判來孤立中國”的文章。所以你可能會認(rèn)為有一個(gè)切實(shí)的政策落地。但我并不相信，主要有四個(gè)原因。

First, this story was clearly leaked by Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, or people close to him. In a normal administration this kind of supposedly inside scoop would offer valuable insights into the policy process. But one thing that’s clear about Trump tariffs is that there is no policy process. Individual officials — Bessent, Peter Navarro, Howard Lutnick — keep floating policy ideas in public, hoping that putting them out there will somehow create facts. But a day or two later another official will go on TV, or Trump will post something on Truth Social, completely contradicting what the last official said.

第一，這個(gè)故事顯然是由財(cái)政部長斯科特·貝森特或他身邊的人泄露的。 在正常政府中，這種所謂的內(nèi)幕消息將為政策過程提供寶貴的見解。但問題是特朗普的關(guān)稅政策的制定根本就沒有一個(gè)正常的流程。別官員——貝森特、彼得·納瓦羅、霍華德·盧特尼克——一直在公共場合傳播政策想法，希望將它們放在那里會以某種方式創(chuàng)造事實(shí)。 但一兩天后，另一位官員將上電視，或者特朗普將在Truth Social上發(fā)布一些東西，這與上一位官員的說法完全矛盾。

So what we’re hearing about Bessent isn’t really a scoop about Trump policy, it’s almost surely an attempt by Bessent to influence policy. And there’s no reason to believe that he’s actually in charge.

因此，我們聽到的關(guān)于貝森特的信息并不是關(guān)于特朗普政策的獨(dú)家新聞，幾乎可以肯定這是貝森特影響政策的企圖。沒有理由相信他真的是負(fù)責(zé)人。

Second, even if U.S. negotiators are trying to cut deals with other countries that would isolate China, they will be unlikely to succeed because Trump has lost all credibility. After all, you can’t make deals with other countries unless foreign governments believe that you will honor the agreements you make. Trump has already destroyed U.S. credibility on that front, ripping up all our existing trade agreements, then making wild changes in his own tariffs every few days.

第二，即使美國談判代表試圖與其他國家達(dá)成孤立中國的協(xié)議，他們也不太可能成功，因?yàn)樘乩势找呀?jīng)失去了所有的信譽(yù)。畢竟，除非外國政府相信你會遵守你達(dá)成的協(xié)議，否則你不能與其他國家達(dá)成協(xié)議。特朗普已經(jīng)破壞了美國在這方面的信譽(yù)，撕毀了我們現(xiàn)有的所有貿(mào)易協(xié)議，然后每隔幾天就大幅改變自己的關(guān)稅。

Third, even if Trump’s promises were credible, why would a European government want to join America’s trade war with China, destroying its own supply chains? If the argument is that it’s worth paying the cost of ruined supply chains because that will protect you from Trump’s tariffs, who trusts Trump not to reimpose punitive tariffs on our supposed allies the next time he thinks they’re looking at him funny?

第三，即使特朗普的承諾是可信的，歐洲政府為何要加入美國與中國的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，而摧毀自己的供應(yīng)鏈呢？ 如果理由摧毀自己的供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)侵档玫模驗(yàn)檫@將保護(hù)自己免受特朗普的關(guān)稅政策的脅迫，那么當(dāng)下次他認(rèn)為歐洲國家在看他笑話的時(shí)候，誰會相信特朗普不會對這些所謂的盟友重新征收懲罰性關(guān)稅？

Fourth, the Trump administration is bringing a knife to a gun fight.

第四，特朗普政府這是在用小刀對抗火槍。

To the extent that there’s a real plan to confront China, it appears to center on reducing China’s ability to sell abroad. It’s true that this will be painful for China’s export sector. As I said, my flat statement that trade is about imports, not exports, needs some qualification because the short-term interests of exporters can’t be ignored. But China can cope with lost exports by aiding affected industries, the same way Trump funneled money to farmers hurt by his first trade war. It can also offset any loss of export jobs by stimulating domestic demand.

在某種程度上，對抗中國行之有效的辦法，應(yīng)集中在削減中國的海外銷售能力。這能夠切實(shí)地給中國出口部門帶來痛苦。正如我所說，我自己的淺見——貿(mào)易的關(guān)鍵是進(jìn)口，而非出口，需要一些論證，因?yàn)槌隹谏痰亩唐诶娌荒芎鲆?。但是中國能夠通過對受影響的出口行業(yè)進(jìn)行補(bǔ)助來彌補(bǔ)出口缺口，就像第一次貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)爭中特朗普對遭受損失的農(nóng)民提供流動性資金。可以通過刺激內(nèi)需來抵消出口工作崗位減少的損失。

So while China can manage the loss of exports in various ways, it will be much harder for America to cope with the loss of crucial inputs produced in China.

因此，雖然中國可以通過各種方式減少出口損失，但美國將更難應(yīng)對來自中國生產(chǎn)的關(guān)鍵進(jìn)口商品的損失。

The overall point is that even relatively sophisticated Trumpers like Bessent are still thinking in terms of Chinese access to the markets of the United States and our imagined trade war allies, when the real issue now is whether China can strangle the U.S. economy by disrupting our supply chains.

總體而言，即使是像貝森特這樣相對老練的特朗普團(tuán)隊(duì)成員，仍然在考慮中國進(jìn)入美國市場和我們想象中的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)盟友，而現(xiàn)在真正的問題是中國能否通過擾亂我們的供應(yīng)鏈來扼殺美國經(jīng)濟(jì)。

PS: I know that I’m mixing metaphors here — China has brought a gun that is strangling us by cutting our supply chains. But you get my point.

PS：我知道我在這里混淆了隱喻——中國帶來了一把槍，通過切斷我們的供應(yīng)鏈來扼殺我們。但你們懂我的意思。

Furthermore, America’s ability to fight a trade war is severely damaged by our descent into authoritarian rule. A few months ago other advanced countries might have been inclined to take our side because of shared democratic values. Now we’ve become a country whose government claims the right to kidnap people whenever it likes and ship them to foreign gulags. Who wants to be allied with such a government? Who will trust such a government to keep its word on anything?

此外，美國打貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的能力因我們陷入專制的統(tǒng)治而受到嚴(yán)重?fù)p害。幾個(gè)月前，由于共同的民主價(jià)值觀，其他發(fā)達(dá)國家可能傾向于站在我們一邊。現(xiàn)在，我們已經(jīng)成為一個(gè)政府聲稱有權(quán)隨時(shí)綁架人并將他們運(yùn)往外國“古拉格集中營”的國家。誰愿意與這樣的政府結(jié)盟？ 誰會相信這樣的政府會信守諾言？

Of course, the fact that the collapse of democracy will contribute to our defeat in the trade war isn’t the main reason to be horrified at where we are. Losing real GDP is bad, but it’s much less important than losing our soul. As it happens, however, we seem to be on track to do both.

當(dāng)然，民主的崩潰將導(dǎo)致我們在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中的失敗，這一事實(shí)并不是我們對現(xiàn)狀感到驚訝的主要原因。失去GDP固然是一件壞事，但失去立國之本更為重要。然而，碰巧的是，這兩者正同時(shí)發(fā)生著。