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作者：煉金女王

來(lái)源：雪球

昨天在看一本老書《至高無(wú)上》，作者分享了8位英國(guó)頂尖投資經(jīng)理，除了安東尼波頓，還有祖魯法則的吉姆斯萊特和新興市場(chǎng)投資大佬莫比爾斯。其中，有一位叫伊恩?拉什布魯克，說(shuō)實(shí)話，我是第一次聽(tīng)說(shuō)這個(gè)名字，查詢之后，先是被他的投資收益折服，伊恩在執(zhí)掌PAT期間，將基金規(guī)模1990年的550萬(wàn)英鎊（其中大部分為其個(gè)人資金），增長(zhǎng)至2008年的1.6億英鎊，近20年實(shí)現(xiàn)29倍規(guī)模增長(zhǎng)，且投資收益持續(xù)大幅跑贏英國(guó)大盤指數(shù)；但更讓我扼腕嘆息的是，他于2008年去世，年僅68歲，在投資的世界，活得久才是關(guān)鍵。

伊恩的投資策略是基于不虧錢為基礎(chǔ)設(shè)計(jì)的，重視倉(cāng)位管理，市場(chǎng)高估時(shí)會(huì)提升現(xiàn)金的比例。并且善于用定量分析來(lái)做宏觀擇時(shí)和股票排除。更為觸動(dòng)我，以及和我想法不謀而合的就是，伊恩的靈活性。他可以投資大盤股，也可以投資小盤股，可以投資英國(guó)市場(chǎng)，也會(huì)涉足全球市場(chǎng)，哪里機(jī)會(huì)大就去哪里，而不是將自己桎梏在一個(gè)圈子里。

最早以前我會(huì)狹隘的理解3P投資，就是簡(jiǎn)單的低市盈率，低市凈率，股價(jià)創(chuàng)新低，但隨著與大師為伍，投資實(shí)踐，我漸漸地理解，投資其實(shí)就是遵循常識(shí)，我們要買能真正創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，具備成長(zhǎng)潛力，擁有一定壟斷能力、持續(xù)產(chǎn)生自由現(xiàn)金流，負(fù)債可控，管理層好、價(jià)格美麗（避免價(jià)值陷阱）的公司。（我持倉(cāng)中有不少需要都賣掉?。?/b>

伊恩，并未出版過(guò)任何書籍，但是在2001年8月PAT 基金的季度通訊中，總結(jié)了他40年投資生涯的十條投資法則，在這里將分享給大家。

《Ten Rules for Investment – the best investment advice you will ever get》 投資十條法則——你能得到的最佳投資建議 ——精煉版

1、看每股增長(zhǎng)，不看規(guī)模擴(kuò)張，拒絕并購(gòu)式虛胖。

2、極度厭惡高負(fù)債，優(yōu)先股東利益，遠(yuǎn)離杠桿陷阱。

3、用總資本回報(bào)率（ROCE）判斷盈利，不被負(fù)債拉高的ROE欺騙。

4、不重復(fù)研究，重點(diǎn)找市場(chǎng)估值里的邏輯錯(cuò)誤。

5、警惕 “看起來(lái)極度便宜” 的標(biāo)的，便宜多事出有因。

6、只投你認(rèn)可、愿意追隨其管理層的公司。

7、不懂不做，不投看不懂業(yè)務(wù)與商業(yè)模式的企業(yè)。

8、寧缺毋濫，一年只抓少數(shù)真正優(yōu)質(zhì)機(jī)會(huì)，耐心等待。

9、低換手、少交易，用 “不折騰” 保護(hù)收益。

10、保持獨(dú)立客觀，不被人情交易綁架決策。

——原文版：

1. Only invest in companies with growth in revenues per share and avoid companies that grow by acquisition.

Mere grows in size is of no benefit to shareholders. The value of the shares is determined not by the size of the company as a whole but by the revenues, earnings and dividends per share, and their rate of growth.

1. 只投資于每股收入增長(zhǎng)的公司，避開(kāi)那些靠收購(gòu)擴(kuò)張的企業(yè)。

單純的企業(yè)規(guī)模擴(kuò)張對(duì)股東并無(wú)益處。股票的價(jià)值不取決于公司的整體規(guī)模，而取決于每股收入、每股收益和每股股息及其增長(zhǎng)率。

2. Avoid highly geared companies like the plague – debt is crippling to management flexibility and corporate growth.

Even though this may sound counterintuitive as equity investors are always inclined to think that gearing is good. Yet the financial graveyard is littered with companies which borrowed too much and came unstuck.

Running a highly geared company also means that the interests of the shareholders is not first in the minds of management but that creditors are. That is never a good situation..

2. 像避開(kāi)瘟疫一樣遠(yuǎn)離高杠桿公司——債務(wù)會(huì)嚴(yán)重束縛管理層的靈活性，阻礙企業(yè)增長(zhǎng)。

盡管這聽(tīng)起來(lái)可能有些反直覺(jué)，因?yàn)楣善蓖顿Y者總是傾向于認(rèn)為杠桿是好事。然而，金融業(yè)的墳?zāi)估?，遍地是因借貸過(guò)多而崩塌的公司。

經(jīng)營(yíng)一家高杠桿公司還意味著，管理層優(yōu)先考慮的不是股東利益，而是債權(quán)人。這絕不是什么好局面。

3. Only invest in companies with an attractive return on total capital employed as opposed to simple and high ROE achieved through debt.

Calculating the return on equity while ignoring the rest of capital employed is a grave mistake. Equity, because of write-offs can also be negative. This would mean that even a small profit will give an infinite ROE.

A better measure of measuring returns is to calculate the return on total capital employed which includes debt, and if you like, deferred tax liabilities which is really an interest free loan from the government.

Return on capital employed is calculated by dividing net profit (before or after tax whatever you prefer) by total equity plus total debt (plus deferred tax liabilities)

3. 只投資于投入總資本回報(bào)率誘人的公司，而不是那些通過(guò)債務(wù)實(shí)現(xiàn)高凈資產(chǎn)收益率的公司。

計(jì)算凈資產(chǎn)收益率而忽視其他投入資本，是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)誤。由于資產(chǎn)核銷，凈資產(chǎn)也可能是負(fù)數(shù)。這意味著即使微薄的利潤(rùn)也會(huì)產(chǎn)生無(wú)窮大的凈資產(chǎn)收益率。

更好的衡量方法是計(jì)算投入總資本回報(bào)率，它包括債務(wù)，如果你愿意的話，還可以包括遞延所得稅負(fù)債——這實(shí)際上是政府提供的一筆無(wú)息貸款。

投入資本回報(bào)率（ROCE）的計(jì)算方法是：凈利潤(rùn)（稅前或稅后均可）÷（總權(quán)益 + 總負(fù)債 ），總負(fù)債包括 遞延所得稅負(fù)債。

另外，重點(diǎn)關(guān)注兩個(gè)指標(biāo)，《至高無(wú)上》有提到，拉什布魯克的投資智慧在于：無(wú)論通脹高低，企業(yè)的本質(zhì)不會(huì)變——它必須有效地將投入轉(zhuǎn)化為產(chǎn)出和利潤(rùn)。

4. The market does 95% of the work for you – your problem is not to duplicate research but to identify errors of logic in company evaluations.

Ian gives an example of banks being the dogs of the stock market in the 1970s and 1980s. Periods of high inflation.

Yet over the five-year period until 2001 banks make shareholders millions. Not because major broking analysts were not analyzing them properly. It was because most investors had failed to spot how attractive banks had become in the new low inflation environment.

Ian mentions that he was never in favor of and always scepitical of the idea of new macroeconomic paradigms. He however mentioned that new paradigms for individual companies and sectors really can emerge. Helping to spot them is an important part of a fund manager’s job.

4. 市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)為你完成了95%的工作——你的問(wèn)題不是重復(fù)研究，而是找出公司估值中的邏輯錯(cuò)誤。

伊恩舉例說(shuō)明了銀行股在20世紀(jì)七八十年代（高通脹時(shí)期）曾是股市的棄兒。

然而，在截至2001年的五年里，銀行股為股東賺取了巨額利潤(rùn)。這不是因?yàn)橹髁魅谭治鰩煕](méi)有正確分析它們，而是因?yàn)榇蠖鄶?shù)投資者未能發(fā)現(xiàn)，在新的低通脹環(huán)境下，銀行股已變得多么誘人。

伊恩提到，他從不贊成且始終對(duì)“新宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)范式”的觀點(diǎn)持懷疑態(tài)度。不過(guò)他指出，針對(duì)個(gè)別公司和行業(yè)的“新范式”確實(shí)可能出現(xiàn)。幫助發(fā)現(xiàn)這些變化，是基金經(jīng)理工作的重要部分。

5. Against the market at any point in time, that which looks statistically cheap is probably dear and visa versa.

What Ian is saying is that there is usually a good reason for apparent valuation anomalies.

This can be summed up as generally speaking the market knows more than you do and there is usually a good reason for apparent anomalies, one market sector being remarkably inexpensive for example.

Be very careful before investing in such anomalies without doing thorough research.

5. 在任何時(shí)點(diǎn)上，與市場(chǎng)相比，那些統(tǒng)計(jì)上看起來(lái)很便宜的股票很可能其實(shí)是貴的，反之亦然。

伊恩的意思是，表面上的估值異常通常有其合理的解釋。

這可以概括為：總的來(lái)說(shuō)，市場(chǎng)知道得比你多，表面上的異?！热缒硞€(gè)行業(yè)板塊異常便宜——通常有其充分理由。

在沒(méi)有進(jìn)行深入研究之前，投資此類異常要格外謹(jǐn)慎。

6. Only invest in companies where you would be willing to work for the chief executive.

This can usually be determined to the answering of a few simple questions.

From the coverage in the media would you as a young person gladly follow such a person?

Can he articulate a sound strategy?

Does he have the charisma to give the company a sense of purpose and excitement?

6. 只投資那些你愿意為其首席執(zhí)行官工作的公司。

這通?？梢酝ㄟ^(guò)回答幾個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單問(wèn)題來(lái)判斷：

從媒體報(bào)道來(lái)看，如果你是個(gè)年輕人，你會(huì)樂(lè)意追隨這樣一個(gè)人嗎？

他能清晰闡述合理的戰(zhàn)略嗎？

他有魅力讓公司充滿使命感和激情嗎？

7. If you do not understand the product or service do not invest in the company.

The most striking example of this rule took place in the time of the South Sea bubble in 1720 when a company was successfully promoted as “for an undertaking which shall in due time be revealed”.

Compare that to the “clicks not profits” idea from the internet bubble and it just goes to show human nature does not change.

7. 如果你不理解產(chǎn)品或服務(wù)，就不要投資這家公司。

這條規(guī)則最突出的例子發(fā)生在1720年南海泡沫期間，當(dāng)時(shí)有一家公司成功募集資金，宣傳語(yǔ)卻是“從事一項(xiàng)待時(shí)機(jī)成熟方予披露的事業(yè)”。

將其與互聯(lián)網(wǎng)泡沫時(shí)期的“點(diǎn)擊量，不盈利”理念相比較，只能說(shuō)明人性從未改變。

8. Working full-time in investment you will probably only see two or three outstanding investment opportunities in a year – be prepared to wait for them.

Investing can sometimes be a lonely and boring pursuit as Warren Buffett has said many times.

Not being able to sit on their hands is probably the biggest problems fund managers have as they think they must show activity to justify their fees.

8. 即使全職從事投資，你一年可能也只能發(fā)現(xiàn)兩三個(gè)絕佳的投資機(jī)會(huì)——要耐心等待。

正如沃倫·巴菲特多次說(shuō)過(guò)的，投資有時(shí)是一件孤獨(dú)而枯燥的事。

基金經(jīng)理最大的問(wèn)題可能就是管不住自己的手，因?yàn)樗麄冇X(jué)得自己必須有所動(dòng)作，才能證明收取管理費(fèi)是合理的。

9. Minimise portfolio turnover.

That is best summarized by the quote “if there’s nothing worth doing it’s worth doing nothing”.

Portfolio turnover can be a substantial drag on your investment returns. Even with internet dealing decreasing transaction costs it still costs about 1% to get in and out of a position.

And with government looking to tax anything and everything this may go up even more.

9. 盡量減少投資組合的換手率。

這句話最好地概括了這一點(diǎn)：“如果沒(méi)有值得做的事，那就不做?！?/p>

投資組合換手率會(huì)嚴(yán)重拖累你的投資回報(bào)。即使互聯(lián)網(wǎng)交易降低了交易成本，進(jìn)出一次頭寸仍需花費(fèi)約1%的成本。

而且，隨著政府想方設(shè)法對(duì)一切征稅，這一成本可能還會(huì)上升。

10. Entertain your broker at your expense rather than his – this will improve his advice dramatically.

If you are entertained by your broker you often feel duty bound to pay for it by placing an order. But if you can afford your own lunches it’s better to keep your investment objectivity by entertaining your broker.

This way he will feel obligated to give you a few good ideas. Always a good position to be in and probably the best meal you ever paid for.

Like good advice on any matter a lot of the points mentioned above are simple common sense.

The only problem is common sense in not that common.

10. 由你做東請(qǐng)你的經(jīng)紀(jì)人吃飯，而不是讓他請(qǐng)你——這會(huì)顯著改善他的建議質(zhì)量。

如果你接受了經(jīng)紀(jì)人的款待，你往往會(huì)覺(jué)得有義務(wù)下一個(gè)訂單來(lái)“回報(bào)”他。但如果你負(fù)擔(dān)得起自己的午餐，最好由你做東請(qǐng)經(jīng)紀(jì)人，從而保持你的投資客觀性。

這樣，他會(huì)覺(jué)得有義務(wù)給你一些好點(diǎn)子。這始終是一個(gè)有利的位置，而且可能是你吃過(guò)的最值的一頓飯。

伊恩：就像任何領(lǐng)域的好建議一樣，上面提到的很多要點(diǎn)其實(shí)都是簡(jiǎn)單的常識(shí)。唯一的問(wèn)題是：常識(shí)這東西，并不那么常見(jiàn)。

雪球三分法是雪球基于“長(zhǎng)期投資+資產(chǎn)配置”推出的基金配置理念，通過(guò)資產(chǎn)分散、市場(chǎng)分散、時(shí)機(jī)分散這三大分散進(jìn)行基金長(zhǎng)期投資，從而實(shí)現(xiàn)投資收益來(lái)源多元化和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分散化。點(diǎn)擊下方圖片立即領(lǐng)取課程