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導(dǎo)語：2026年2月5日，美國(guó)與俄羅斯之間的《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》（New START）將正式到期。若未能達(dá)成臨時(shí)安排或繼任協(xié)議，限制全球兩大核武庫(kù)的最后一項(xiàng)具有法律約束力的框架或?qū)⒉粡?fù)存在。在俄烏沖突延宕、北極戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)升溫的背景下，核約束賴以發(fā)揮穩(wěn)定作用的政治與安全環(huán)境持續(xù)弱化。與此同時(shí)，中東核不擴(kuò)散形勢(shì)也再度承壓。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普重返白宮后，正第三次嘗試通過談判與伊朗達(dá)成核協(xié)議，但分歧依舊突出：伊朗堅(jiān)持將解除制裁作為談判前提，并要求議題僅限核問題；而美方則試圖將導(dǎo)彈能力等更廣泛?jiǎn)栴}納入討論。在濃縮鈾處置這一關(guān)鍵問題上，伊朗拒絕將高豐度濃縮鈾轉(zhuǎn)移出境，而美方及以色列方面堅(jiān)持相關(guān)要求，談判前景充滿不確定性。

在這一背景下，CGTN官網(wǎng)近日刊發(fā)IPP副研究員李品保博士關(guān)于全球核軍控機(jī)制未來走向的評(píng)論文章。文章指出，《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》即將到期，若缺乏替代性安排，美俄戰(zhàn)略核力量可能進(jìn)入長(zhǎng)期缺乏約束的狀態(tài)。這不僅將削弱全球核領(lǐng)域的透明度與可預(yù)測(cè)性，也可能加劇核競(jìng)爭(zhēng)和誤判風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，對(duì)全球核不擴(kuò)散體系產(chǎn)生連鎖的負(fù)面影響。

本文作者

李品保

IPP副研究員

2026年2月5日，美國(guó)與俄羅斯之間的《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》（Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty，簡(jiǎn)稱“New START”）將正式到期，這可能意味著限制全球兩大核武庫(kù)的最后一項(xiàng)具有法律約束力的框架終結(jié)。若未能達(dá)成臨時(shí)安排或繼任協(xié)議，美俄戰(zhàn)略力量將自1970年代初以來首次在無協(xié)議約束的情況下運(yùn)作。

當(dāng)前俄烏沖突持續(xù)、北極戰(zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇、中東核計(jì)劃再度引發(fā)關(guān)切，條約到期將標(biāo)志著核約束與可預(yù)測(cè)性的嚴(yán)重倒退，其影響將遠(yuǎn)超美俄兩國(guó)范疇。

New START于2010年簽署，并于2021年延長(zhǎng)五年。條約規(guī)定，雙方部署的戰(zhàn)略核彈頭上限為1550枚，部署的洲際彈道導(dǎo)彈、潛射彈道導(dǎo)彈和重型轟炸機(jī)不超過700件，已部署及未部署的戰(zhàn)略發(fā)射工具總數(shù)不超過800件。

除數(shù)量限制外，條約還建立了一整套廣泛的核查與透明機(jī)制，包括定期數(shù)據(jù)交換、通報(bào)制度、現(xiàn)場(chǎng)核查以及用于處理履約問題的雙邊協(xié)商委員會(huì)。這些措施降低了不確定性，限制了“最壞情形”推演，并增進(jìn)了對(duì)彼此核態(tài)勢(shì)的了解。該條約為推動(dòng)全球核武庫(kù)從1980年代中期的約7萬枚彈頭削減至如今的約1.2萬枚發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵作用，彰顯了持續(xù)軍控對(duì)遏制無序競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的價(jià)值。

2010年，時(shí)任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)奧巴馬和俄羅斯總統(tǒng)梅德韋杰夫在布拉格簽署《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》后合影。圖源：www.kremlin.ru.

近年來，該條約效力不斷削弱。新冠疫情期間，雙方暫停了相互核查；2023年2月，俄羅斯以西方在烏克蘭的行動(dòng)為由宣布暫停履約。盡管雙方仍表示將遵守核心數(shù)量限制，但核查機(jī)制和正式對(duì)話已基本停滯。

《原子科學(xué)家公報(bào)》2026年1月將“末日之鐘”撥至距離午夜僅85秒，創(chuàng)歷史最近紀(jì)錄，理由正是核競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇、軍控對(duì)話缺失以及New START即將到期等。

末日時(shí)鐘由 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists（《原子科學(xué)家公報(bào)》）于1947年設(shè)立。該刊的創(chuàng)辦人中包括多位參與過“曼哈頓計(jì)劃”的科學(xué)家，初衷是提醒公眾：核武器時(shí)代帶來的生存風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。圖源：Jamie Christiani

政策制定者如今面臨一個(gè)嚴(yán)峻選擇：是維持某種形式的自愿約束，還是任由美俄核軍控的最后支柱徹底崩塌？

俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京曾提議，將條約核心限制以政治協(xié)議形式延長(zhǎng)一年，為談判爭(zhēng)取時(shí)間。美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普最初稱此提議“是個(gè)好主意”，但雙方迄今尚未達(dá)成正式協(xié)議，這增加了出現(xiàn)無約束空窗期的可能性。在當(dāng)前條件下，談判一項(xiàng)全面的后續(xù)條約極為困難，因其需要就定義、計(jì)數(shù)規(guī)則、核查機(jī)制等進(jìn)行多年技術(shù)性工作，并依賴持續(xù)的外交接觸與互信。而在持續(xù)沖突與深度互疑的背景下，這些條件大多缺失。

若New START到期且無替代，最直接的后果將是解除對(duì)已部署戰(zhàn)略彈頭與運(yùn)載工具的數(shù)量限制。雙方都可能采取“加裝”（uploading）方式，即在現(xiàn)有導(dǎo)彈上迅速增加彈頭部署，這在技術(shù)上可行且可迅速實(shí)施。美國(guó)軍控協(xié)會(huì)執(zhí)行主任達(dá)里爾·金博爾（Daryl Kimball）就曾警告稱，若無臨時(shí)協(xié)議，美俄可能在35年多來首次擴(kuò)大已部署武庫(kù)。此舉將增加成本、加深互疑、降低透明度，并在危機(jī)時(shí)期提高誤判風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

《新削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》到期后美俄核武庫(kù)的可能變化。圖源：Jessica Rogers等

條約的核查與透明措施對(duì)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定至關(guān)重要，有助于雙方理解彼此能力與意圖。這些機(jī)制的消失或?qū)⑵仁管娛乱?guī)劃者依賴猜測(cè)，增加最壞情況推演與局勢(shì)迅速升級(jí)的可能性。

更廣泛而言，New START到期將削弱全球核治理體系，破壞數(shù)十年來有助于避免災(zāi)難的核約束規(guī)范。其失效正值2026年《不擴(kuò)散核武器條約》審議大會(huì)前夕，這將釋放危險(xiǎn)信號(hào)，表明核大國(guó)正在背離裁軍承諾，可能加劇有核國(guó)與無核國(guó)之間的分歧，并使防擴(kuò)散努力復(fù)雜化。

在一個(gè)主要大國(guó)可能放棄核約束的世界中，擴(kuò)散壓力或?qū)⒃龃�。一些無核國(guó)家可能尋求來自盟友更強(qiáng)有力的“核保護(hù)傘”，另一些則可能認(rèn)定自主核能力是生存必需。近期的事態(tài)發(fā)展，如2026年2月2日，伊朗最高國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)秘書處外交政策副秘書阿里·巴蓋里-卡尼（Ali Bagheri Kani）聲明伊朗不會(huì)尋求核武器，或有助于全球穩(wěn)定并提供審慎信心。

當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間2月2日，伊朗最高國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)秘書處外交政策副秘書阿里·巴蓋里-卡尼表示，有關(guān)伊朗可能向外國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移濃縮核材料的說法不符合事實(shí)，伊朗在核問題談判中的立場(chǎng)始終明確。圖源：路透社

中國(guó)立場(chǎng)強(qiáng)調(diào)戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定與負(fù)責(zé)任的克制。中國(guó)一貫奉行“不首先使用核武器”政策，將核武庫(kù)維持在國(guó)家安全所需的最低水平。同時(shí)，中國(guó)支持核武器國(guó)家就降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、透明度和建立信任措施開展對(duì)話，呼吁大國(guó)承擔(dān)起防止軍備競(jìng)賽、降低核風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的特殊責(zé)任。從這個(gè)角度看，維系美俄之間某種形式的相互約束——無論是通過臨時(shí)延長(zhǎng)還是新的政治承諾——不僅符合兩國(guó)利益，更是全球穩(wěn)定的基石。

即便New START失效，仍存在降低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的選擇，正如當(dāng)年《削減戰(zhàn)略武器條約》（START）與New START之間四個(gè)月空窗期時(shí)那樣。自愿約束、持續(xù)溝通、危機(jī)管理機(jī)制以及五個(gè)公認(rèn)核武器國(guó)家間的多邊接觸，有助于防止核治理體系徹底崩潰。重申“核戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)打不贏也打不得”原則，強(qiáng)化危機(jī)熱線，避免破壞穩(wěn)定的部署行為——包括美國(guó)“金色穹頂”（Golden Dome）系統(tǒng)等不受限制的導(dǎo)彈防御計(jì)劃及相關(guān)天基能力——對(duì)降低全球核風(fēng)險(xiǎn)至關(guān)重要。

New START從來都不是一個(gè)完美的解決方案，但它在大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)加劇的時(shí)代提供了逾十年的可預(yù)測(cè)性，限制了核擴(kuò)張，奠定了戰(zhàn)略穩(wěn)定的基礎(chǔ)。其失效將壓縮戰(zhàn)略誤判的容錯(cuò)空間。即使保持有限的克制，也遠(yuǎn)比進(jìn)入一個(gè)充滿不信任、加速現(xiàn)代化和日益加劇的核擴(kuò)散壓力所標(biāo)志的無約束核未來更為可取。

文章于2026年2月3日刊登于CGTN官網(wǎng)，原標(biāo)題為《New START nears expiry as global nuclear arms control faces critical test》。點(diǎn)擊圖片鏈接閱讀原文。圖源：CGTN網(wǎng)站截圖

*以下為英文原文，供讀者對(duì)照參考（請(qǐng)上下滑動(dòng)查看）。

On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia is set to expire, potentially ending the last remaining legally binding framework limiting the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. If no interim arrangement or successor is reached, the U.S. and Russian strategic forces would operate for the first time since the early 1970s without agreed constraints. The expiration comes amid ongoing conflict in Ukraine, strategic competition in the Arctic and renewed concerns over nuclear programs in the Middle East, and it would signal a significant retreat from nuclear restraint and predictability, with implications extending far beyond Washington and Moscow.

New START, signed in 2010 and extended in 2021 for five years, capped each side at 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, limited deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to 700, and restricted total deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers to 800. Beyond numerical limits, it established an extensive verification and transparency regime, including regular data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections and a Bilateral Consultative Commission to address compliance issues. These measures reduced uncertainty, limited worst-case planning and provided insight into each side's nuclear posture. The treaty has been instrumental in reducing global nuclear stockpiles from roughly 70,000 warheads in the mid-1980s to around 12,000 today, demonstrating the value of sustained arms control in preventing unconstrained competition.

The treaty's effectiveness has eroded in recent years. Mutual inspections were paused during the COVID-19 pandemic, and in February 2023, Russia announced it was suspending participation, citing Western actions in Ukraine. While both sides have continued to signal adherence to core numerical limits, verification mechanisms and formal dialogue have largely collapsed. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has highlighted rising nuclear risks, moving its Doomsday Clock in January 2026 to 85 seconds to midnight, the closest ever, citing intensifying nuclear competition, absent arms control dialogue and New START's impending expiration.

Policymakers now face a stark choice: whether to maintain some form of voluntary restraint or allow the last U.S.-Russia nuclear arms control pillar to disappear entirely. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proposed a one-year political extension of the treaty's core limits to buy time for negotiations, which U.S. President Donald Trump initially called "a good idea," though no formal agreement has been reached, raising the prospect of a gap period with no binding constraints. Negotiating a comprehensive successor treaty would be extremely difficult under current conditions, as it would require years of technical work on definitions, counting rules and verification mechanisms, as well as sustained diplomatic engagement and trust. Such conditions remain largely absent amid ongoing conflicts and deep mutual suspicion.

If New START expires without replacement, the immediate consequence would be the removal of caps on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems. Both sides could respond by "uploading" additional warheads onto existing missiles, a technically feasible step that could be executed quickly. Daryl Kimball, executive director of the U.S.-based Arms Control Association, has warned that without a temporary agreement, the United States and Russia could expand deployed arsenals for the first time in more than 35 years. Such a move would increase costs, deepen mistrust, reduce transparency and elevate the risk of miscalculation during crises.

The treaty's verification and transparency measures have been critical to strategic stability, helping both sides understand each other's capabilities and intentions. Their disappearance would force military planners to rely on assumptions, raising the likelihood of worst-case planning and rapid escalation. More broadly, the collapse of New START would weaken the global nuclear governance system, undermining norms of restraint that have helped prevent catastrophe for decades. Its lapse just ahead of the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference would send a troubling signal that nuclear powers are retreating from disarmament commitments, potentially exacerbating divisions between nuclear and non-nuclear states and complicating efforts to prevent proliferation.

In a world where major powers may abandon nuclear restraint, the pressures for proliferation could grow. Some non-nuclear states might seek stronger "nuclear umbrellas" from allies, while others could conclude that independent nuclear capabilities are necessary for survival. Recent developments, including Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani's February 2, 2026, statement that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons, may contribute to global stability and provide cautious reassurance.

China's position emphasizes strategic stability and responsible restraint. Beijing is not a party to New START and has consistently maintained a nuclear policy of no first use, keeping its arsenal at the minimum level required for national security. At the same time, China supports dialogue among nuclear-weapon states on risk reduction, transparency and confidence-building measures, calling for major powers to uphold their special responsibilities in preventing arms races and reducing nuclear risks. From this perspective, preserving some form of mutual restraint between the United States and Russia, whether through a temporary extension or a renewed political commitment, is not only in the interest of the two countries but also essential for global stability.

Even if New START expires, options remain to mitigate risk, much as they did during the brief four-month interval between START and New START. Voluntary restraint, sustained communication, crisis management mechanisms and multilateral engagement among the five recognized nuclear-weapon states could help prevent a complete breakdown of nuclear governance. Reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, strengthening crisis hotlines and avoiding destabilizing deployments – including unconstrained missile defense initiatives such as the U.S. "Golden Dome" system and related space-based capabilities – would be essential to reducing global nuclear risks.

New START was never a perfect solution, but it has provided over a decade of predictability, limited nuclear expansion and a foundation of strategic stability amid increasing great-power rivalry. Its expiration will narrow the margin for error. Preserving even limited forms of restraint remains far preferable to entering an unconstrained nuclear future marked by heightened mistrust, accelerated modernization and growing proliferation pressures.

IPP公共關(guān)系與傳播中心

排版 | 周浩鍇

校對(duì) | 劉 深

終審 | 劉金程

李品保 華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院 副研究員

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華南理工大學(xué)公共政策研究院（IPP）是一個(gè)獨(dú)立、非營(yíng)利性的知識(shí)創(chuàng)新與公共政策研究平臺(tái)。IPP圍繞中國(guó)的體制改革、社會(huì)政策、中國(guó)話語權(quán)與國(guó)際關(guān)系等開展一系列的研究工作，并在此基礎(chǔ)上形成知識(shí)創(chuàng)新和政策咨詢協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展的良好格局。IPP的愿景是打造開放式的知識(shí)創(chuàng)新和政策研究平臺(tái)，成為領(lǐng)先世界的中國(guó)智庫(kù)。