龔鵬程對(duì)話(huà)海外學(xué)者第一百零五期：在后現(xiàn)代情境中，被技術(shù)統(tǒng)治的人類(lèi)社會(huì)，只有強(qiáng)化交談、重建溝通倫理，才能獲得文化新生的力量。這不是誰(shuí)的理論，而是每個(gè)人都應(yīng)實(shí)踐的活動(dòng)。龔鵬程先生遊走世界，并曾主持過(guò)“世界漢學(xué)研究中心”。我們會(huì)陸續(xù)推出“龔鵬程對(duì)話(huà)海外學(xué)者”系列文章，請(qǐng)他對(duì)話(huà)一些學(xué)界有意義的靈魂。范圍不局限于漢學(xué)，會(huì)涉及多種學(xué)科。以期深山長(zhǎng)谷之水，四面而出。

塞西爾·奧爾杜伊教授（Professor Ce?cile Alduy）

美國(guó)斯坦福大學(xué)法語(yǔ)和意大利語(yǔ)教授、法語(yǔ)和意大利語(yǔ)部主任

龔鵬程教授：您好。最近，法國(guó)舉行了一次全國(guó)性的總統(tǒng)選舉。您能否談?wù)勚鲗?dǎo)政治討論的主要議題？

塞西爾·奧爾杜伊教授：龔教授，您好。此次大選發(fā)生在烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)爆發(fā)后、新冠疫情爆發(fā)后的2022年4月。從2022年9月開(kāi)始到2022年2月為止的前半程選舉中，輿論集中討論了極右派候選人埃里克·澤穆?tīng)枺èic Zemmour）提出的移民、安全、文化認(rèn)同感等問(wèn)題。他的意識(shí)形態(tài)路線(xiàn)與唐納德·特朗普（ Donald Trump）和特朗普的顧問(wèn)史蒂夫·班農(nóng)（Steve Bannon）類(lèi)似，澤穆?tīng)栐谵q論中強(qiáng)加了“本土”法國(guó)人被移民大取代的理論——這是一種以前從未在法國(guó)獲得如此多關(guān)注的陰謀論。

但是，一旦烏克蘭戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)開(kāi)始，各政治派別討論的主要問(wèn)題是生活成本增加和通貨膨脹，以及歐盟支持烏克蘭和對(duì)俄羅斯資產(chǎn)和公司實(shí)施禁運(yùn)的地緣政治局勢(shì)。這些經(jīng)濟(jì)和地緣政治問(wèn)題是選民在選舉前幾周的民意調(diào)查中宣稱(chēng)他們最感興趣的兩個(gè)主要話(huà)題。

左派的候選人也提出了社會(huì)正義和如何應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化的問(wèn)題；而極右派的候選人則繼續(xù)談?wù)撘泼窈臀幕J(rèn)同。但生活成本，以及像俄羅斯石油和天然氣禁運(yùn)這樣迫在眉睫的能源危機(jī)，是主導(dǎo)辯論和采訪的主要問(wèn)題。

在這種情況下，現(xiàn)任總統(tǒng)埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍（Emmanuel Macron）作為當(dāng)時(shí)主持歐盟事務(wù)的國(guó)家總統(tǒng)，發(fā)揮了主導(dǎo)作用，而且他已經(jīng)實(shí)施了經(jīng)濟(jì)措施來(lái)阻止能源價(jià)格，幫助解決天然氣價(jià)格問(wèn)題，因此他具有優(yōu)勢(shì)。他在4月22日的選舉中以58%的選票獲勝。

The presidential election happened in April 2022, right after the onset of the war in Ukraine, and in the wake of the covid-19 pandemic. In the first half of the campaign, from September 2022 to roughly February 2022, the media concentrated on the topics raised by far-right candidate éric Zemmour on immigration, safety, and cultural identity. His ideological line is similar to that of Donald Trump and Trump’s counselor Steve Bannon, and Zemmour imposed in the debate the theory of the Great Replacement of “native” French by immigrants – a conspiracy theory that had never before gained so much attention in France.

But once the war in Ukraine started, the major issues discussed across the political spectrum were the increased cost of life and inflation, and the geopolitical situation with the European Union’s support of Ukraine and embargo on Russian assets and companies. These economic and geopolitical ussies were the two main topics that voters declared they were most interested in hearing about in opinion polls in the weeks leading to the election.

Candidates on the left also brought up the issues of social justice and how to fight climate change; and candidates on the far right continued to talk about immigration and cultural identity. But cost of life, and the energy crisis that was looming with the embargo on Russian oil and gas, were the main issues that dominated debates and interviews.

In that context, incumbent President Emmanuel Macron, who had a leading role as President of the nation that was presiding over the European Union at the time, and who had already implemented economic measures to block the prices of energy and help with gas prices, had an advantage. He won the election on April 22 with 58% of the votes.

龔鵬程教授：您是研究民族陣線(xiàn)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，即讓·馬里·勒龐（Jean-Marie Le Pen）和瑪麗娜·勒龐（Marine Le Pen）的國(guó)家修辭的專(zhuān)家。在何種意義上，極右派的修辭與中間派和左派的修辭不同？瑪麗娜·勒龐（Marine Le Pen）在最近的競(jìng)選中主要使用了哪些修辭方法？

塞西爾·奧爾杜伊教授：極右話(huà)語(yǔ)從根本上依賴(lài)于摩尼教的二元論，將 “我們” 與 “他們” 對(duì)立起來(lái)，認(rèn)為這是不可調(diào)和的對(duì)立。這是字面意義上的基本的仇外話(huà)語(yǔ)："異種恐懼癥“ 意味著對(duì)異種 “外國(guó)”、外來(lái)、其他事物的恐懼、“害怕” 或 “憎恨”。民族陣線(xiàn)的言論通過(guò)語(yǔ)言和圖像構(gòu)建了 “內(nèi)部群體”（“我們，法國(guó)人”）和 “他者” 之間的對(duì)立，“他者” 可以是猶太人（對(duì)讓·瑪麗·勒龐而言）、精英、穆斯林、移民等，具體取決于背景和年代。它通常還與災(zāi)難主義敘事同時(shí)進(jìn)行，宣布法國(guó)的存在處于危險(xiǎn)之中，并呼吁一位偉大的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人發(fā)揮權(quán)威作用來(lái)拯救國(guó)家。

瑪麗娜·勒龐（Marine Le Pen）使用了這種基本的修辭模式，但她也將其現(xiàn)代化，并在2022年的總統(tǒng)競(jìng)選中加入了關(guān)于入不敷出的下層公民的日常生活成本的務(wù)實(shí)的民粹主義論述。

在現(xiàn)代化方面，她消除了國(guó)民議會(huì)話(huà)語(yǔ)中的任何反猶太主義殘余—?這與她父親的許多反猶太主義挑釁形成鮮明對(duì)比—?她在家庭價(jià)值觀和世俗主義方面支持了更現(xiàn)代的立場(chǎng)。她聲稱(chēng)自己是法國(guó)女性的捍衛(wèi)者，并不反對(duì)同性婚姻，并承諾自己永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)質(zhì)疑女性選擇墮胎的權(quán)利——這再次與她的父親形成強(qiáng)烈對(duì)比，她的父親曾在某個(gè)時(shí)候宣稱(chēng)墮胎類(lèi)似于“法國(guó)種族滅絕”，并批評(píng)“同性戀游說(shuō)團(tuán)體”的力量。

通過(guò)這種修辭上的改造使其更現(xiàn)代化，瑪麗娜·勒龐（Marine Le Pen）成功地使她的政黨正?；?，使其聽(tīng)起來(lái)成為主流而不是極端。這種讓政黨形象正?；淖龇◤囊婚_(kāi)始就是她的溝通策略：她的分析是，為了能夠在法國(guó)這樣的兩輪制度中贏得選舉，民族陣線(xiàn)需要停止用極端和論戰(zhàn)性的言論嚇跑選民。相反，通過(guò)軟化話(huà)語(yǔ)，將自己塑造成下層階級(jí)困境的務(wù)實(shí)支持者，她正在努力擴(kuò)大自己的基礎(chǔ)。

Far right discourse relies fundamentally on a Manichean, binary rhetoric that opposes as irreconcilable and antagonistic a “us” versus a “them.” This is the basis of a xenophobic discourse in the literal sense of the word: “xeno-phobia” meansphobia, “fear” or “hatred” of what is xeno“foreign”, alien, other. The National Front’s rhetoric constructs through words and images an antagonism between an “in-group” (“us, the French”) and Others, who can be, depending on context and decade, the Jews (for Jean-Marie Le Pen), the elite, Muslims, immigrants, etc. It usually also goes hand in hand with a catastrophist narrative that declares the very existence of France in peril and calls for a great leader to take on an authoritative role in saving the country.

Marine Le Pen has used this basic rhetorical model, but she has also modernized it, and, in the 2022 presidential campaign, added a pragmatic, populist discourse on the cost of everyday life for lower class citizens that can’t make ends meet. In terms of modernization, she has erased any antisemitic remnants from the National Rally’s discourse – a stark contrast to her father’s many antisemitic provocations – and she has espoused a more modern stance on family values and secularism. A divorced single mother of three, she claims to defend French women, did not much oppose gay marriage, and promised she would never put into question the right for women to choose to have an abortion – again, in strong contrast to her father, who had declared at some point that abortion was akin to a “French genocide” and had criticized the power of a “gay lobby.”

With this rhetorical make over and modernization, Marine Le Pen has successfully attempted to normalize her party, to make itsound mainstream and not extreme. This normalization of the image of the party has been her communication strategy since the beginning: her analysis is that to be able to win the elections in a two-round system like France’s, the National Front needs to stop scaring off voters by extreme and polemical statements. Instead, by softening the discourse and presenting itself as a pragmatic champion of the lower classes’ woes, she is trying to widen her base.

龔鵬程教授：埃里克·澤穆?tīng)枺‥ric Zemmour）是法國(guó)政壇的另一個(gè)極右派人物，他在第一輪總統(tǒng)選舉中獲得第四名。您寫(xiě)了《澤穆?tīng)柕恼Z(yǔ)言》（La Langue de Zemmour）一書(shū)，講述了埃里克·澤穆?tīng)枺‥ric Zemmour）使用的語(yǔ)言。您如何描述澤穆?tīng)枺╖emmour）的語(yǔ)言，它與勒龐（Le Pen）的語(yǔ)言有什么區(qū)別？

塞西爾·奧爾杜伊教授：埃里克·澤穆?tīng)枺èic Zemmour）和瑪麗娜·勒龐（Marine Le Pen）有著相同的民族主義和仇外意識(shí)形態(tài)，有著相同的世界觀，即一個(gè)被移民圍困的國(guó)家，其身份和安全受到伊斯蘭教的威脅。他們也有幾乎相同的政治綱領(lǐng)（除了在稅收方面有很大的不同）。但他們向選民展示的方式不同，采取的溝通策略也相反。

如上所述，瑪麗娜·勒龐（Marine Le Pen）并沒(méi)有改變她所在的極右翼政黨的政治議程，但她讓該黨的話(huà)語(yǔ)和詞匯現(xiàn)代化了，讓它聽(tīng)起來(lái)不那么極端，而更容易達(dá)成共識(shí)?，旣惸取だ正嫞∕arine Le Pen）甚至以共和主義（有時(shí)是世俗主義或女權(quán)等左翼思想）的名義表達(dá)了對(duì)移民的反對(duì)和對(duì)伊斯蘭教的攻擊。

相比之下，埃里克·澤穆?tīng)枺èic Zemmour）是一位記者、論戰(zhàn)者和作家，他明確地將自己定義為“文化戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)” 的戰(zhàn)士，反對(duì)自由主義、左派思想和概念（如性別平等、反歧視措施、個(gè)人自由、反種族主義）的所謂文化霸權(quán)。他通過(guò)鍛造一種新的 “語(yǔ)言” 來(lái)發(fā)動(dòng)這場(chǎng) “戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”（這是我書(shū)中的論點(diǎn)），在其結(jié)構(gòu)和詞匯中強(qiáng)加另一種世界觀，其中 “人權(quán)” 被嘲弄（并系統(tǒng)地放在諷刺性的引號(hào)中），性別的概念被取代，被生理性別的差異上不可避免的力量所取代，這種力量迫使人們接受女性“應(yīng)該”屈服于權(quán)力，“種族戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)”構(gòu)成了每一種分析，等等。因此，他的修辭策略不是軟化典型的極右言論，而是將其作為一種價(jià)值體系，作為一種新的規(guī)范，通過(guò)一次又一次的重復(fù)，強(qiáng)加給人們，讓最極端的言論開(kāi)始逐漸消退，讓人們習(xí)慣于此。

但是，就算澤穆?tīng)枺╖emmour）和瑪麗娜·勒龐采（Marine Le Pen）取了不同的修辭策略，他們?nèi)匀粫?huì)相互使對(duì)方的語(yǔ)言強(qiáng)化。埃里克·澤穆?tīng)枺èic Zemmour）的暴力言論使瑪麗娜-勒龐（Marine Le Pen）在競(jìng)選期間在選民眼中顯得溫順和“正?！?，同時(shí)適應(yīng)了移民是法國(guó)的生命威脅這一觀點(diǎn)。相反，當(dāng)瑪麗娜·勒龐（Marine Le Pen）在第二輪總統(tǒng)選舉中獲得42%的選票時(shí)，這就是澤穆?tīng)枺╖emmour）發(fā)動(dòng)的 “文化戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)” 的勝利，它將澤穆?tīng)柕氖澜缬^進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)加為“主流”。

éric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen share the same nationalist and xenophobic ideology, the same world view of a country besieged by immigration and threatened in its identity and safety by Islam. They also have in common almost the same political platform (except for differences on taxation mostly). But they present things differently to voters and have adopted opposite communication strategies.

As seen above, Marine Le Pen has not changed the political agenda of her far-right party, but she has modernized its discourse and vocabulary, and made it sound less extreme, and more consensual. Even the fight against immigration and the attacks on Islam are expressed by Marine Le Pen in the name of republican, sometimes leftist ideas such as secularism or women’s rights.

By contrast, éric Zemmour is a journalist, polemicist, and writer who has explicitly defined himself as a warrior in a “cultural war” against the supposed cultural hegemony of liberal, leftist ideas and concepts (such as gender equality, anti-discrimination measures, individual liberties, anti-racism). He wages this “war” with words by forging a new “l(fā)anguage” (that’s the thesis of my book) that would impose in its very structure and vocabulary another worldview where “human rights” are mocked (and systematically put within ironical quotation marks), where the concept of gender is replaced by that of the inescapable power of biological sexual difference that imposes to accept that women are not “meant” to yield power, where the “war of races” frames every analysis, etc. So, his rhetorical strategy isnot to soften the typical far right rhetoric, but to impose it as a value system, as a new norm, by repeating it again and again, so that the most extreme statements start to wear off, and people get used to them.

But if Zemmour and Marine Le Pen have adopted different rhetorical strategies, they both reinforce each other: éric Zemmour’s violent rhetoric made Marine Le Pen look tamed and “normal” to voters during the campaign, while acclimating the idea that immigration is a life threat to France. Conversely, when Marine Le Pen gains 42% of the votes in the second round of the presidential election, it is a victory in the “cultural war” that Zemmour is waging, and it imposes further as “mainstream” Zemmour’s worldview.

龔鵬程教授：您也是法國(guó)文藝復(fù)興時(shí)期詩(shī)歌的專(zhuān)家，您已經(jīng)出版了很多不相關(guān)著作。您覺(jué)得哪個(gè)法國(guó)詩(shī)人特別有趣，為什么？

塞西爾·奧爾杜伊教授：皮埃爾·德·隆薩（Pierre de Ronsard）（1524-1585）是法國(guó)文藝復(fù)興時(shí)期及在后來(lái)影響最廣的詩(shī)人。他不僅寫(xiě)了幾千首詩(shī)、一部史詩(shī)、挽歌、頌歌、幾本愛(ài)情十四行詩(shī)，并歌頌了他那個(gè)時(shí)代的所有國(guó)王，而且他是一個(gè)精明的宣傳者，他是最早將“作者” 的概念作為權(quán)威的法國(guó)詩(shī)人之一（在此之前，在中世紀(jì)時(shí)期，很多詩(shī)歌都是匿名的，詩(shī)人不會(huì)試圖收集他們的作品，或者把控自己的形象）。隆薩（Ronsard）是在16世紀(jì)伴隨著印刷品的出現(xiàn)和廣泛的傳播而長(zhǎng)大的。他從一開(kāi)始就明白印刷品擁有幫助塑造自我形象的力量，并善于通過(guò)雕刻、書(shū)信和創(chuàng)造自己的國(guó)王詩(shī)人的神話(huà)來(lái)塑造自我形象。

我最欣賞隆薩（Ronsard）的一點(diǎn)是，他在事業(yè)剛起步時(shí)，甚至在他還不出名的時(shí)候，就設(shè)法讓人相信，他將成為法國(guó)的新彼特拉克（Petrarch）和新奧維德（Ovid）。27歲時(shí)，他寫(xiě)了第一本愛(ài)情十四行詩(shī)《勝利之愛(ài)》(1552)，在這本書(shū)中，他創(chuàng)造了自己詩(shī)意不朽的神話(huà)。就在這本書(shū)的扉頁(yè)后面，他插入了一幅雕刻作品，將自己塑造成不朽的桂冠詩(shī)人，他穿著羅馬皇帝的衣服，戴著桂冠——就像彼特拉克（Petrarch）或拉丁詩(shī)人那樣——盡管隆薩本人只有27歲，剛剛出版了一本不起眼的詩(shī)集。他還需要證明一切（他還有很多東西需要證明），但他卻在雕刻和詩(shī)歌中為自己塑造了一個(gè)“詩(shī)人王子”的形象。

Pierre de Ronsard (1524-1585) was the most widely influential poet of the French Renaissance, and beyond. Not only did he write thousands of poems, an epic, elegies, odes, several books of love sonnets, and sang all the kings of his age, but he was a shrewd publicist of his own glory, and one of the first French poet to impose the idea of the“author” as source of authority and unique voice (before, in the medieval period, lots of poems were anonymous, and poets would not try to collect their works, or control their own image). Ronsard came of age in the 16th century along the advent and wider dissemination of print. He understood from the onset the power of print to help craft a self-image and was adept at self-fashioning through engravings, epigraphs, and creating his own myth as Poet of the King.

What I most admire in Ronsard is that he managed to impose at the very onset of his career, when he was not even well known, the idea that he would be the new Petrarch and the new Ovid of France. At 27, he wrote a fist book of love sonnets,Les Amours de Cassandre (1552), in which he created the myth of his own poetic immortality. Just after the title page of his book, he inserted an engraving that immortalized himself as a poet laureate dressed like a Roman emperor and crowned with laurels - like Petrarch or the Latin poets were – even though Ronsard himself was only 27 and had just published one obscure book of odes. He had still everything to prove, yet he fabricated an image of himself – in the engraving and in the poems – as the“Prince of Poets!”

龔鵬程，1956年生于臺(tái)北，臺(tái)灣師范大學(xué)博士，當(dāng)代著名學(xué)者和思想家。著作已出版一百五十多本。

辦有大學(xué)、出版社、雜志社、書(shū)院等，并規(guī)劃城市建設(shè)、主題園區(qū)等多處。講學(xué)于世界各地。并在北京、上海、杭州、臺(tái)北、巴黎、日本、澳門(mén)等地舉辦過(guò)書(shū)法展?，F(xiàn)為中國(guó)孔子博物館名譽(yù)館長(zhǎng)、臺(tái)灣國(guó)立東華大學(xué)終身榮譽(yù)教授、美國(guó)龔鵬程基金會(huì)主席。