編者按：2025年12月底，中國(guó)人民大學(xué)重陽(yáng)金融研究院院長(zhǎng)、全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)王文應(yīng)邀接受挪威東南大學(xué)國(guó)際關(guān)系學(xué)教授、著名政治學(xué)者格倫·迪森（Glenn Diesen）YouTube專訪。這是繼、以來(lái)的第三次對(duì)談，從多個(gè)角度全面解讀中國(guó)的“去美國(guó)化”戰(zhàn)略 ，訪談上線后不到一周即收獲近500條肯定性的熱評(píng)。 現(xiàn)將對(duì)話視頻及中英文內(nèi)容 發(fā)布如下： （中文約8600字，預(yù)計(jì)閱讀時(shí)間24分鐘）

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01

“去美國(guó)化”戰(zhàn)略并非中國(guó)主動(dòng)預(yù)設(shè)

而是源于美國(guó)壓力

格倫·迪森：歡迎回來(lái)。我們今天邀請(qǐng)到了中國(guó)人民大學(xué)重陽(yáng)金融研究院院長(zhǎng)、絲路學(xué)院副院長(zhǎng)王文教授，非常感謝您再次做客。

我最近讀了您的一篇文章，覺(jué)得非常有意思。我們可以看到中美關(guān)系已經(jīng)發(fā)展了相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間。大約在二、三十年前，人們還常常談?wù)撝袊?guó)和美國(guó)之間的相互依賴。但如今，我們看到的是美國(guó)在許多指標(biāo)上不斷走弱，而中國(guó)不斷變得強(qiáng)大，這也帶來(lái)了彼此相互的猜疑與恐懼。

人們常說(shuō)，如果你欠別人一百美元，那是你的麻煩；但如果你欠一百萬(wàn)，那就是別人的麻煩。我想我們正朝著類似局面發(fā)展。

而在2008年到2009年全球金融危機(jī)背景下，中美關(guān)系變得更加不穩(wěn)定，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)主導(dǎo)的金融體系開(kāi)始出現(xiàn)裂痕。如今，美國(guó)更加擔(dān)憂中國(guó)的崛起，談?wù)摗懊撱^”、“去風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”、“友岸外包”等。當(dāng)然中國(guó)也必須以某種方式回應(yīng)，設(shè)法降低對(duì)這一關(guān)系的依賴。正是在這樣的背景下，您寫下了這篇。我認(rèn)為這很引人入勝。

我覺(jué)得一個(gè)好的切入點(diǎn)是：能否請(qǐng)您概述一下，中國(guó)推動(dòng)“去美國(guó)化”的動(dòng)因是什么？這在多大程度上僅僅是對(duì)美國(guó)政策的回應(yīng)？又能否應(yīng)對(duì)新的多極權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)現(xiàn)實(shí)——即中國(guó)不能“把雞蛋放在一個(gè)籃子里”？

王文：謝謝你，迪森教授，很高興再次見(jiàn)到你，也非常感謝你關(guān)注我的文章。這篇文章于10月發(fā)表在，過(guò)去一個(gè)月產(chǎn)生了很大反響。很多美國(guó)、歐洲、日本以及其他國(guó)家的朋友都讀了這篇文章，很大程度上是因?yàn)闃?biāo)題：中國(guó)的“去美國(guó)化”戰(zhàn)略。

在這篇文章中，我談到了過(guò)去七年中國(guó)“去美國(guó)化”進(jìn)程中的六個(gè)領(lǐng)域：包括貿(mào)易、金融、安全、思想、高科技和教育，列舉了大量數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)佐證我的觀察。

正如你所問(wèn)到的，所謂的“去美國(guó)化”戰(zhàn)略，并不是中國(guó)主動(dòng)預(yù)設(shè)，而是被美國(guó)逼出來(lái)的。事實(shí)上，自1978年改革開(kāi)放以來(lái)，中國(guó)一直努力與美國(guó)建立友好關(guān)系，對(duì)美采取開(kāi)放態(tài)度，吸引美資，發(fā)展對(duì)美貿(mào)易，并學(xué)習(xí)美國(guó)公司的管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)和金融市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作。

我想提及一個(gè)很可怕且龐大的數(shù)據(jù)：截至2016年，中國(guó)對(duì)外貿(mào)易仍有約20%依賴美國(guó)。坦率地說(shuō)，這種依賴過(guò)去對(duì)中國(guó)有利。但在特朗普上臺(tái)不久，美國(guó)便開(kāi)始推行遏制中國(guó)的政策，發(fā)動(dòng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，扣押華為高管孟晚舟，對(duì)包括華為在內(nèi)的數(shù)千家中國(guó)企業(yè)實(shí)施制裁。這些遏制性政策令中國(guó)感到威脅，也促使中國(guó)采取反制與調(diào)整。

正如我在中指出：中國(guó)人民早已覺(jué)醒，不再像過(guò)去那樣盲目崇拜美國(guó)。他們?cè)絹?lái)越意識(shí)到，過(guò)度依賴美國(guó)已成危險(xiǎn)之舉。從這個(gè)角度看，正是美國(guó)，迫使中國(guó)采取了所謂的“去美國(guó)化”戰(zhàn)略。

今年我，因?yàn)樗胺Q一位獨(dú)特的政治教育導(dǎo)師。他不僅教會(huì)中國(guó)人民看清美國(guó)的虛偽行徑與國(guó)際社會(huì)的殘酷本質(zhì)，更重要的是，他教會(huì)我們?nèi)绾卧诂F(xiàn)代化進(jìn)程中采取必要措施，捍衛(wèi)國(guó)家的核心利益。這就是我所說(shuō)的“去美國(guó)化”的目的。

02

貿(mào)易“去美國(guó)化”正是對(duì)美反制能取得成功的關(guān)鍵原因

格倫·迪森：誠(chéng)然，我認(rèn)為學(xué)者與政策制定者必須清醒認(rèn)識(shí)到，大國(guó)之間始終存在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，坦誠(chéng)面對(duì)這一現(xiàn)實(shí)至關(guān)重要。唯有如此才能明確妥協(xié)空間，既能在利益協(xié)調(diào)與合作中尋求共識(shí)，又始終清醒認(rèn)識(shí)到競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的必然性。

那么，該如何妥善處理并緩解這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，特別是其中最具零和性質(zhì)的方面？理想情況下，我們應(yīng)將其轉(zhuǎn)化為良性競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，避免將經(jīng)濟(jì)爭(zhēng)端軍事化。

但要知道，上世紀(jì)90年代，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)高度集中，當(dāng)時(shí)的全球化在很大程度上意味著美國(guó)化。說(shuō)白了，全球都在使用美國(guó)的技術(shù)、產(chǎn)業(yè)、航運(yùn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)、銀行體系乃至貨幣體系。隨著權(quán)力格局的演變，兩者之間的關(guān)系必須變化，這是合理的。這既會(huì)催生合作，也會(huì)引發(fā)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

總而言之，我認(rèn)為這就是所謂“去美國(guó)化”，其實(shí)正是對(duì)這種現(xiàn)實(shí)的認(rèn)識(shí)。

不過(guò)我仍有疑問(wèn)：中國(guó)正推動(dòng)貿(mào)易多元化，將貿(mào)易從美國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)移到其他國(guó)家，逐步減少對(duì)美國(guó)的依賴。就整個(gè)世界或國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)而言，你認(rèn)為這會(huì)產(chǎn)生哪些深遠(yuǎn)影響？

王文：您提出的問(wèn)題確實(shí)很有見(jiàn)地。據(jù)我所知，自2013年中國(guó)提出“一帶一路”倡議以來(lái)，中國(guó)越來(lái)越重視與“全球南方”國(guó)家的合作。中國(guó)與俄羅斯、中亞、拉美、非洲以及東南亞等地區(qū)的雙邊貿(mào)易額年均增長(zhǎng)率均超過(guò)10%。與此同時(shí)，過(guò)去十年間，中美雙邊貿(mào)易總額的相對(duì)比重呈現(xiàn)下降趨勢(shì)。這種現(xiàn)象，我稱之為“貿(mào)易去美國(guó)化”或“結(jié)構(gòu)性調(diào)整”，也就是說(shuō)中國(guó)在貿(mào)易上對(duì)美國(guó)減少了依賴。

正如您剛才提到的，以一組數(shù)據(jù)為例：五年前，中國(guó)與俄羅斯的雙邊貿(mào)易額僅為1000億美元左右，而五年后的現(xiàn)在，已達(dá)2500億美元，預(yù)計(jì)未來(lái)五年將突破3000億美元大關(guān)。中拉貿(mào)易額已經(jīng)超過(guò)5000億美元，且今年起，這一規(guī)模有望在未來(lái)五年內(nèi)超過(guò)中美貿(mào)易總額。因?yàn)榻衲曛忻离p邊貿(mào)易額僅約為5000億美元。換句話說(shuō)，在中國(guó)未來(lái)的對(duì)外貿(mào)易版圖中，拉丁美洲的重要性可能超過(guò)美國(guó)。

我認(rèn)為這本質(zhì)上是多元化戰(zhàn)略。因此，盡管未來(lái)美國(guó)仍會(huì)是中國(guó)重要的貿(mào)易伙伴，但其重要程度正在下降。中國(guó)貿(mào)易“去美國(guó)化”的戰(zhàn)略結(jié)果，使中國(guó)的全球貿(mào)易結(jié)構(gòu)更加均衡且安全。這正是中國(guó)2025年應(yīng)對(duì)美國(guó)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)時(shí)，反制措施能取得成功的關(guān)鍵原因。中國(guó)在貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中不怕美國(guó)。相反，正如許多媒體報(bào)道，美國(guó)已輸?shù)?025年中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，主要原因是美國(guó)在中國(guó)外貿(mào)格局中的份額持續(xù)萎縮。在2015年，中美貿(mào)易約占中國(guó)對(duì)外貿(mào)易總額的20%，而如今這一比例已降至9%。

另一方面，中國(guó)對(duì)外貿(mào)易結(jié)構(gòu)的再平衡，有利于世界各國(guó)的發(fā)展。中國(guó)向全球出口了更多高質(zhì)量、高性價(jià)比的商品，實(shí)現(xiàn)了商品和生產(chǎn)的“去美國(guó)化”，并幫助“全球南方”國(guó)家從中國(guó)的發(fā)展中受益。眾所周知，過(guò)去發(fā)展中國(guó)家依賴西方 產(chǎn)品，這些產(chǎn)品雖質(zhì)量上乘但價(jià)格太貴。如今，中國(guó)在貿(mào)易領(lǐng)域的國(guó)際價(jià)格改革，使得“全球南方”國(guó)家以同等價(jià)格購(gòu)買更多高質(zhì)量的中國(guó)商品，從而獲得更多實(shí)惠。這就是我經(jīng)常說(shuō)的：中國(guó)的崛起對(duì)世界有利。

過(guò)去常有人認(rèn)為，中國(guó)制造價(jià)格便宜但質(zhì)量不是很好，近年來(lái)中國(guó)產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量越來(lái)越高，例如在電動(dòng)汽車、太陽(yáng)能發(fā)電以及電力裝備等等領(lǐng)域。我認(rèn)為，中國(guó)現(xiàn)在發(fā)起了一場(chǎng)國(guó)際價(jià)格改革，這對(duì)“全球南方”國(guó)家具有積極意義。

03

中美技術(shù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)未來(lái)最終會(huì)造福全人類

只要雙方保持理性

格倫·迪森：確實(shí)如此。我完全贊同中國(guó)的做法。中國(guó)正在擺脫對(duì)美國(guó)的依賴，實(shí)現(xiàn)多元化。而且“去美國(guó)化”并不等同于反美。我剛從武漢回來(lái)，之前在中國(guó)幾所大學(xué)做了客座講座，講的是俄羅斯與歐洲的關(guān)系。

王文：你應(yīng)該來(lái)北京。

格倫·迪森：確實(shí)該來(lái)的，但是時(shí)間太緊張了。不過(guò)我剛才說(shuō)的是俄羅斯的地緣經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，其實(shí)與我們討論的主題相關(guān)。你剛剛談到多元化，如果國(guó)家間合作而不推動(dòng)多元化，我認(rèn)為這是妄想。

我曾向俄羅斯方面強(qiáng)調(diào)，中國(guó)是其最重要的合作伙伴，也在構(gòu)建多極體系。但由于中國(guó)體量遠(yuǎn)超對(duì)方，這種不對(duì)稱性會(huì)帶來(lái)依賴關(guān)系的不對(duì)等。這本身未必是問(wèn)題，但需要說(shuō)明的是，俄羅斯也在關(guān)鍵技術(shù)領(lǐng)域追求戰(zhàn)略自主，例如建立自己的數(shù)字基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。他們也會(huì)尋求多元化，例如加強(qiáng)與印度等大國(guó)的貿(mào)易。中國(guó)仍是最重要的合作伙伴，但正如我們所言，沒(méi)有哪個(gè)國(guó)家會(huì)把所有雞蛋放在一個(gè)籃子里，因此各國(guó)都力求多元化布局。

我認(rèn)為關(guān)鍵在于認(rèn)知層面。這表明立場(chǎng)并不一定非此即彼，也不是國(guó)家與經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的運(yùn)作方式。這同樣適用于美國(guó)，如果美國(guó)擔(dān)心過(guò)度依賴中國(guó)，那么在我看來(lái)，應(yīng)該追求高度的技術(shù)自主權(quán)，而非試圖通過(guò)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)擊潰中國(guó)。這是兩碼事，后者極具破壞性和危險(xiǎn)性。

如果中美雙方能坐下來(lái)協(xié)商，當(dāng)然雙方在戰(zhàn)略自主、技術(shù)、產(chǎn)業(yè)等領(lǐng)域通過(guò)某種貿(mào)易協(xié)定，管理競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，那么很多問(wèn)題都能得到妥善解決。那種認(rèn)為一切都必須永遠(yuǎn)處于零和博弈的觀點(diǎn)，我認(rèn)為是錯(cuò)誤的。

不過(guò)，這引出了我的下一個(gè)問(wèn)題。多年來(lái)，中國(guó)作為技術(shù)追趕者一直在努力追趕美國(guó)，而如今，美國(guó)與中國(guó)的科技競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已演變?yōu)榧夹g(shù)主導(dǎo)權(quán)之爭(zhēng)。你認(rèn)為這種態(tài)勢(shì)會(huì)如何加劇雙方在技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的對(duì)抗？

王文：正如你所說(shuō)，從多方面來(lái)看，如今中國(guó)的高科技產(chǎn)業(yè)正在迎頭趕上。我認(rèn)為這對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)是件好事。我們有信心迅速?gòu)?fù)蘇并崛起?；仡欉^(guò)去七年，特朗普總統(tǒng)對(duì)中國(guó)實(shí)施高科技壁壘、遏制華為等眾多公司，無(wú)疑是一場(chǎng)非常嚴(yán)峻且激烈的高科技競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。

但在我看來(lái)，高科技并不是美國(guó)獨(dú)有的。任何國(guó)家都不能壟斷高科技的研發(fā)和生產(chǎn)，也不應(yīng)該借壟斷高科技過(guò)度獲利，更不能把高科技武器化，壓制其他國(guó)家，包括中國(guó)。因此，高科技領(lǐng)域的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)應(yīng)當(dāng)是公平的、以市場(chǎng)為基礎(chǔ)的。作為一個(gè)新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體，中國(guó)通過(guò)持續(xù)提升技術(shù)環(huán)境、加大研發(fā)投入，在越來(lái)越多的領(lǐng)域?qū)崿F(xiàn)了技術(shù)突破。這很正常，也很成功。

中國(guó)沒(méi)有竊取、沒(méi)有掠奪、沒(méi)有參與殖民主義，所以美國(guó)沒(méi)有理由指責(zé)中國(guó)行為不當(dāng)或是不友好。我注意到一些媒體聲稱，中國(guó)竊取美國(guó)技術(shù)，但這種說(shuō)法同樣站不住腳。我舉一個(gè)歷史上很有趣的例子：大家都知道指南針和火藥都是中國(guó)發(fā)明的，且在1000多年前，隨后美國(guó)和其他西方國(guó)家都采用了這一發(fā)明并推動(dòng)了技術(shù)革命。中國(guó)從未因此指責(zé)美國(guó)竊取中國(guó)技術(shù)。同樣，中國(guó)在美國(guó)現(xiàn)有高科技產(chǎn)品與技術(shù)基礎(chǔ)上持續(xù)創(chuàng)新，甚至在高鐵基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施、電動(dòng)汽車、太陽(yáng)能等領(lǐng)域超越美國(guó)。這種發(fā)展既造福人類，又推動(dòng)文明進(jìn)步。

因此，我認(rèn)為當(dāng)前中美之間的高科技競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是正常的。中國(guó)科學(xué)家正在適應(yīng)這種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，社會(huì)各界也能理性看待。我們不應(yīng)以意識(shí)形態(tài)的角度來(lái)評(píng)判其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，美國(guó)也不應(yīng)使用政治手段，特別是金融制裁、域外管轄和技術(shù)封鎖等手段來(lái)應(yīng)對(duì)科技競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。相反，我認(rèn)為美國(guó)應(yīng)該以更開(kāi)放的心態(tài)迎接這場(chǎng)技術(shù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。技術(shù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)應(yīng)當(dāng)是健康的。我認(rèn)為，中美技術(shù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)未來(lái)最終會(huì)造福全人類，只要雙方保持理性。

04

美元霸權(quán)不利影響遠(yuǎn)大于其益處

格倫·迪森：我認(rèn)為這個(gè)觀點(diǎn)很有說(shuō)服力。科技確實(shí)會(huì)擴(kuò)散，且本該擴(kuò)散。當(dāng)然這種擴(kuò)散可以帶來(lái)積極影響。如果中美之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)能夠得到妥善管理，甚至可能對(duì)世界大有裨益。當(dāng)全球僅存一個(gè)權(quán)力中心、一個(gè)技術(shù)主導(dǎo)國(guó)時(shí)，這個(gè)國(guó)家就有減緩擴(kuò)散的意愿和能力，以維持其先發(fā)優(yōu)勢(shì)。然而，一旦出現(xiàn)兩個(gè)或更多技術(shù)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者時(shí)，技術(shù)擴(kuò)散速度將顯著加快，因?yàn)楦鞣蕉急仨毻ㄟ^(guò)技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移等激勵(lì)來(lái)爭(zhēng)取廣泛的支持。

我們可以在如今俄羅斯與印度的軍事技術(shù)合作中看到這一點(diǎn)。俄方愿意向印方轉(zhuǎn)讓大量技術(shù)，這也使得印度更青睞俄羅斯而非西方陣營(yíng)。當(dāng)然，有人可能會(huì)說(shuō)武器技術(shù)的傳播未必是好的，但總體而言，技術(shù)傳播應(yīng)當(dāng)被視為促進(jìn)全球平等或公平的積極因素。

但我確實(shí)認(rèn)為，美國(guó)之所以陷入恐慌，是因?yàn)樗麄儸F(xiàn)在實(shí)際上已無(wú)法與中國(guó)有效競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，這是他們對(duì)因?yàn)槁浜蠖a(chǎn)生不穩(wěn)定的恐懼。美國(guó)“尋租經(jīng)濟(jì)模式”導(dǎo)致其生產(chǎn)成本居高不下，而中國(guó)作為工業(yè)強(qiáng)國(guó)，能夠大規(guī)模應(yīng)用人工智能等新技術(shù)并從中獲利。在美國(guó)，出于對(duì)與中國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的恐慌，他們投入了大量資金。例如在人工智能領(lǐng)域，有很多投資失誤，造成了巨大的人工智能泡沫，如今他們顯然已無(wú)力賺回這些投資。如今美國(guó)政府陷入了這種局面：美國(guó)曾指控中國(guó)實(shí)行國(guó)家主導(dǎo)的資本主義，而如今自己卻要掌控科技公司，這種立場(chǎng)前后矛盾。但這場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的走向確實(shí)耐人尋味。

不過(guò)，我想談?wù)劷鹑陬I(lǐng)域，因?yàn)槟奈恼轮幸矊懥私鹑陬I(lǐng)域的“去美國(guó)化”。那么中國(guó)如何才能實(shí)現(xiàn)金融多元化，擺脫對(duì)美國(guó)金融工具的依賴？不少人認(rèn)為中國(guó)只是想擺脫美元。您認(rèn)為中國(guó)在多大程度上仍會(huì)繼續(xù)使用美元呢？

王文：是的，金融領(lǐng)域的“去美國(guó)化”非常重要。我不確定你是否了解過(guò)去七年的情況。超過(guò)2000家中國(guó)公司曾受到美國(guó)金融制裁。這些制裁往往缺乏法律依據(jù)，只會(huì)增加我們所有中國(guó)人對(duì)美國(guó)金融霸權(quán)的怨恨，促使我們尋求有效的應(yīng)對(duì)方法。

另一方面，中國(guó)采取更多反制措施，使美國(guó)為其金融制裁付出必要代價(jià)，從而維護(hù)了中國(guó)的國(guó)家利益。同時(shí)，中國(guó)也減少了對(duì)美元的依賴，在雙邊貿(mào)易、國(guó)際合作中采取更多“去美國(guó)化”措施，并推動(dòng)國(guó)際金融支付體系的改革。與其說(shuō)這是針對(duì)美國(guó)的措施，不如說(shuō)是中國(guó)為維護(hù)自身利益而被迫采取的行動(dòng)。

當(dāng)前，美元霸權(quán)不利影響遠(yuǎn)大于其益處。二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束后美元霸權(quán)確實(shí)為國(guó)際金融穩(wěn)定做出了貢獻(xiàn)。但如今看來(lái)，美元的強(qiáng)勢(shì)已成為全球國(guó)際金融與經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易體系改革的最大障礙。全世界都應(yīng)該減少對(duì)美元的依賴，以降低金融風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和遭受美元制裁的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

你剛才提到的俄羅斯問(wèn)題，如果問(wèn)俄羅斯人民，每一個(gè)俄羅斯人都會(huì)回答我們需要減少對(duì)美國(guó)的金融依賴，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)使用金融武器化來(lái)威懾俄羅斯。

我認(rèn)為未來(lái)國(guó)際金融和國(guó)際貨幣體系的多元化，將更有助于各國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展和社會(huì)穩(wěn)定。我預(yù)測(cè)到2035年，美元霸權(quán)將進(jìn)一步削弱，人民幣以及其他貨幣的國(guó)際化趨勢(shì)將持續(xù)增強(qiáng)，越來(lái)越多的國(guó)家將減少對(duì)美元的依賴。我認(rèn)為這是未來(lái)發(fā)展的必然趨勢(shì)。

05

中美應(yīng)做“普通鄰居”

格倫·迪森：很有意思，你提到這些非法制裁。文獻(xiàn)中常有觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為一個(gè)衰落的霸權(quán)國(guó)家總會(huì)面臨兩難境地。它該如何過(guò)渡，或現(xiàn)在該采取什么行動(dòng)？一方面，它可能推動(dòng)向多邊體系的轉(zhuǎn)型，維持金融穩(wěn)定；另一方面，它可能會(huì)通過(guò)制裁新興力量試圖維持其霸權(quán)地位，實(shí)質(zhì)上將金融權(quán)力工具武器化。但這種做法只會(huì)加速全球其他國(guó)家與其脫鉤。

他們之所以提及俄羅斯，是因?yàn)槠站┰鴮?duì)美國(guó)人說(shuō)，俄羅斯從未真正推行過(guò)脫鉤美元的政策，是美國(guó)主動(dòng)讓我們與美元脫鉤。這件事是你逼迫的。但即便制裁明天就解除，俄羅斯人也再不會(huì)信任西方貨幣、銀行、支付系統(tǒng)或保險(xiǎn)體系了。因此，美國(guó)走上第二條道路的選擇極具破壞性。

這或許深植于人性之中。誰(shuí)都不愿眼睜睜看著自己的霸權(quán)地位消失，總想加以維護(hù)。但如今，這種行為已經(jīng)變成自我傷害，成為一個(gè)危險(xiǎn)的信號(hào)。隨著中國(guó)日益“去美國(guó)化”，原本可能只是溫和的再平衡，如今卻演變成中國(guó)將美元和美國(guó)金融視為威脅，不惜一切代價(jià)規(guī)避。這很難看出符合美國(guó)的利益。

我換個(gè)角度問(wèn)你，你把這種“去美國(guó)化”定義為建立中國(guó)模式作為替代方案，可以展開(kāi)講講嗎？這具體意味著什么？

王文：事實(shí)上，其余國(guó)家的發(fā)展進(jìn)程——你提到了西方和其他國(guó)家都在探索自己的發(fā)展模式，這可以視為“去美國(guó)化”。過(guò)去半個(gè)世紀(jì)以來(lái)，大多數(shù)國(guó)家的現(xiàn)代化進(jìn)程都以美國(guó)為藍(lán)本。哈佛大學(xué)教授塞繆爾·亨廷頓，我們都很熟悉他。多年前他寫了一本書，他曾寫到自20世紀(jì)70年代以來(lái)，人類政治發(fā)展已進(jìn)入“第三波”浪潮。另一位著名學(xué)者弗朗西斯·福山提出了“歷史終結(jié)論”。他們所指的是，多國(guó)發(fā)展路徑都向美國(guó)模式趨同。

我們當(dāng)然曾經(jīng)欽佩甚至崇拜美國(guó)的發(fā)展模式，但問(wèn)題是，正如您提到，2008年國(guó)際金融危機(jī)，特別是2017年特朗普上任以來(lái)，全球各國(guó)都在重新審視自身發(fā)展路徑，并調(diào)整與美國(guó)的關(guān)系。例如俄羅斯、巴西、印度、印度尼西亞等新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體，都在重新審視自己的國(guó)家發(fā)展定位和身份。這些國(guó)家正在尋求保衛(wèi)自己的國(guó)家安全，并在政治模式、經(jīng)濟(jì)體制、金融工具和軍事體系等領(lǐng)域，探索符合自身國(guó)情的發(fā)展方向。中國(guó)也不例外。

首先，中國(guó)必須確保自身政治體制的安全，中國(guó)不愿重蹈蘇聯(lián)解體的覆轍，絕不會(huì)允許美國(guó)在中國(guó)境內(nèi)挑起“顏色革命”。過(guò)去20年，世界上許多國(guó)家都經(jīng)歷了與美國(guó)有關(guān)的“顏色革命”。

其次，中國(guó)還必須確保經(jīng)濟(jì)、貿(mào)易和金融自主權(quán)，防止美國(guó)控制中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)命脈。事實(shí)上，許多國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)都因過(guò)度依賴美國(guó)而受其制約，特別是拉丁美洲的一些國(guó)家，這可以稱之為“新殖民主義”。

第三，中國(guó)必須保障自身的科技和軍事安全：必須防止美國(guó)遏制其科技和軍事發(fā)展，并防止其構(gòu)成長(zhǎng)期威脅。同時(shí)，中國(guó)必須推進(jìn)國(guó)家統(tǒng)一，在未來(lái)幾年內(nèi)解決臺(tái)灣問(wèn)題至關(guān)重要。此外，中國(guó)需要發(fā)展獨(dú)立自主的知識(shí)體系和意識(shí)形態(tài)，以抵御美國(guó)在文化上殖民，防止持續(xù)不斷的“美國(guó)化”滲透。

這并非要與美國(guó)徹底脫鉤，是要與美國(guó)建立一種正常的關(guān)系：既避免過(guò)度依賴，也不回避必要的合作。

我舉個(gè)很有意思的例子，雖然我不太確定它是否完全貼切。我曾說(shuō)過(guò)，中國(guó)和美國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層就像一對(duì)親密戀人，特別是上世紀(jì)八九十年代以及“9·11”事件后的21世紀(jì)初。當(dāng)時(shí)中國(guó)支持美國(guó)的反恐戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，兩國(guó)關(guān)系非常融洽。甚至在2008年北京奧運(yùn)會(huì)期間，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)也來(lái)到北京，與中國(guó)國(guó)家主席共同慶祝奧運(yùn)會(huì)的圓滿成功。

多年前，中美兩國(guó)關(guān)系確實(shí)非常密切，幾乎如同親密伴侶一般。但展望未來(lái)，我期待中美關(guān)系能像普通鄰居一樣。

鄰國(guó)之間難免會(huì)有摩擦，但仍保持互動(dòng)。面對(duì)共同挑戰(zhàn)，他們會(huì)互相幫助。底線是，中美之間必須不惜一切代價(jià)避免軍事沖突，因?yàn)檫@對(duì)任何一方都沒(méi)有好處。我相信未來(lái)中美關(guān)系將回歸正常軌道。

06

應(yīng)當(dāng)培養(yǎng)更多真正服務(wù)于中國(guó)的高素質(zhì)、高水平人才

格倫·迪森：這個(gè)比喻我很中意，政治學(xué)界常提及這個(gè)比喻。尤其對(duì)大國(guó)而言，若彼此過(guò)于親近，反而可能引發(fā)過(guò)多矛盾，最終導(dǎo)致關(guān)系破裂；但若兩人分居，雖無(wú)法維持婚姻關(guān)系，卻能成為好鄰居。很多情況下，這種“分離但不脫鉤”的做法反而是一種更優(yōu)選擇。對(duì)于像中美這樣的大國(guó)，彼此間可能始終存在著潛在的猜疑，公開(kāi)對(duì)抗無(wú)益于任何一方，“去美國(guó)化”有其合理性。

俄羅斯如今也采取類似策略。俄羅斯曾尋求與歐洲更緊密的融合，但由此產(chǎn)生的緊張局勢(shì)變得難以維系，如今雙方似乎都認(rèn)為與其繼續(xù)糾纏，不如分道揚(yáng)鑣。與其追求更親密的關(guān)系，不如努力成為鄰居。

這一點(diǎn)也與“顏色革命”有關(guān)，我認(rèn)為這是抵制“美國(guó)化”的重要意義所在。這些革命在世界各地造成了諸多問(wèn)題，尤其是在歐洲。并非說(shuō)這是一場(chǎng)陰謀，但他們的做法遵循著一種令人不安的模式。美國(guó)的做法認(rèn)為，民主必須包含一個(gè)強(qiáng)大的公民社會(huì)，一個(gè)能夠獨(dú)立于政府、自我組織的公民社會(huì)，這一點(diǎn)本身無(wú)可厚非。但他們更進(jìn)一步，明確指出組織公民社會(huì)的應(yīng)該是非政府組織，更具體地說(shuō)是美國(guó)的非政府組織，甚至是由國(guó)家資助的非政府組織。這些非政府組織由美國(guó)政府資助，并與美國(guó)情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)有關(guān)聯(lián)，但不知何故，它們卻想要去影響中國(guó)公民和社會(huì)，這簡(jiǎn)直是荒唐至極。

試想一下，如果中國(guó)政府與其情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)合作，試圖影響美國(guó)的公民和社會(huì)，無(wú)疑會(huì)遭到強(qiáng)烈抵制。事實(shí)上，歷史證據(jù)已經(jīng)表明，早在1983年，里根總統(tǒng)和中央情報(bào)局局長(zhǎng)已經(jīng)開(kāi)始建立諸如“國(guó)家民主基金會(huì)”之類的非政府組織，其目的就是為了操縱和控制其他國(guó)家的公民社會(huì)。不需要用武力征服他國(guó)，只需控制其公民社會(huì)即可。這是一個(gè)巨大的問(wèn)題，也是如今歐洲戰(zhàn)亂頻仍的原因之一。

我的最后一個(gè)問(wèn)題是：鑒于我們都是學(xué)者，教育在“去美國(guó)化”過(guò)程中扮演著怎樣的角色？教育是如何“去美國(guó)化”的？

王文：正如我之前提到的，“民主”和“公民社會(huì)”之類的詞匯，在過(guò)去曾經(jīng)廣受推崇，但現(xiàn)在我們已經(jīng)清楚地認(rèn)識(shí)到，類似“民主”和“公民社會(huì)”之類的這些詞匯極具美國(guó)特色，這種美國(guó)特色在他們自己的語(yǔ)境中有著非常特殊的意義。正因如此，我們回到您最后提出的問(wèn)題：教育。如今中國(guó)教育同樣需要與美國(guó)保持正常關(guān)系。

我們?nèi)缃裾罅ν苿?dòng)中國(guó)知識(shí)體系與教材自主化建設(shè)，特別在過(guò)去五年間，中國(guó)編寫的相關(guān)教材持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)，特別是在政治學(xué)、經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、金融學(xué)、社會(huì)學(xué)及法學(xué)等相關(guān)領(lǐng)域。

令人擔(dān)憂的是，過(guò)去三十年間，每年有近百萬(wàn)中國(guó)青年赴海外求學(xué)，其中超過(guò)40%選擇美國(guó)。他們?cè)侵袊?guó)大學(xué)里最優(yōu)秀、最聰明的學(xué)生，在美國(guó)獲得碩士或博士學(xué)位后，許多人選擇留美為美國(guó)服務(wù)。一個(gè)很有意思的數(shù)據(jù)是，硅谷超過(guò)30%的AI科學(xué)家本科學(xué)位都是在中國(guó)獲得的。所以我常開(kāi)玩笑說(shuō)，過(guò)去七八年中美之間進(jìn)行了一場(chǎng)非常激烈的高科技競(jìng)賽，但這所謂的“高科技競(jìng)賽”，其本質(zhì)是中國(guó)本土的中國(guó)人與在美國(guó)的中國(guó)人之間的較量。其實(shí)這也是不正常的。

因此你提到教育的“去美國(guó)化”，意味著要使中國(guó)教育發(fā)展回歸正常狀態(tài)，并維持正常的發(fā)展關(guān)系。我們當(dāng)然支持中國(guó)青年赴美留學(xué)，也歡迎美國(guó)學(xué)生來(lái)華深造，但這種交流不應(yīng)演變?yōu)檫^(guò)度依賴。

然而特朗普總統(tǒng)卻拒絕更多中國(guó)學(xué)生赴美留學(xué)，甚至禁止中國(guó)學(xué)生在美國(guó)學(xué)習(xí)科學(xué)、技術(shù)、工程和數(shù)學(xué)學(xué)科。我必須要“感謝”特朗普總統(tǒng)，這完全沒(méi)問(wèn)題。越來(lái)越多的優(yōu)秀中國(guó)留學(xué)生將留在中國(guó)高校，未來(lái)為國(guó)家服務(wù)。因此從這個(gè)角度看，中美兩國(guó)在新的歷史條件下尋求新的教育定位。我認(rèn)為這種雙邊關(guān)系的重新定位，將有利于未來(lái)兩國(guó)的發(fā)展。

簡(jiǎn)而言之，回到你的問(wèn)題，中國(guó)教育必須走自己的道路。中國(guó)必須擁有自己的知識(shí)體系和意識(shí)形態(tài)體系、紀(jì)律體系、教科書體系與理論體系。我們應(yīng)當(dāng)培養(yǎng)更多真正服務(wù)于中國(guó)的高素質(zhì)、高水平人才，而非將大量頂尖人才輸送至美國(guó)為其服務(wù)。我認(rèn)為這正是教育新常態(tài)的體現(xiàn)。

我真的很感謝迪森教授給我機(jī)會(huì)深入解釋“去美國(guó)化”。我再次強(qiáng)調(diào)，“去美國(guó)化”并不等于脫鉤，僅意味著我們將恢復(fù)與美國(guó)的正常關(guān)系。我們不希望像過(guò)去那樣依賴美國(guó)，因此我認(rèn)為與美國(guó)的關(guān)系正?；瘜?duì)雙方都有利。這就是我的要點(diǎn)，再次感謝。

格倫·迪森：感謝。您提到的人才流失現(xiàn)象確實(shí)耐人尋味，許多國(guó)家都經(jīng)歷過(guò)這種情況。最優(yōu)秀的人才往往選擇出國(guó)，尋求更好的發(fā)展機(jī)會(huì)；但隨著國(guó)內(nèi)就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的增加，他們自然會(huì)留在國(guó)內(nèi)。然而如今這種針對(duì)中國(guó)學(xué)者的歧視，不僅是學(xué)者，還有專業(yè)人士，正導(dǎo)致大批專業(yè)人士大規(guī)模離開(kāi)美國(guó)，紛紛返回中國(guó)，形成一場(chǎng)反向人才爭(zhēng)奪戰(zhàn)。這種現(xiàn)象最終為中國(guó)帶來(lái)了顯著利益，使其獲得大量?jī)?yōu)秀且經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的專業(yè)人才回歸。

您說(shuō)“不脫鉤”，“去美國(guó)化”實(shí)際上是多元化。我認(rèn)為這或許是個(gè)積極因素，對(duì)世界而言是件好事。可以說(shuō)，多極化的權(quán)力格局、多元主義而非一元普遍主義，能賦予國(guó)際體系更強(qiáng)的抗沖擊能力。從古希臘到美國(guó)建國(guó)，這種理念始終是其根基所在。

正如古希臘諸城邦及其他所有不同的城邦，在政府體制、教育模式、經(jīng)濟(jì)政策等方面進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新實(shí)踐：誰(shuí)做得成功，其他人可能會(huì)效仿他們，它們相互學(xué)習(xí)，而不是將所有人塞進(jìn)同一個(gè)框架。美國(guó)最初通過(guò)其聯(lián)邦州制度也體現(xiàn)了這一理念。如今中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)確實(shí)呈現(xiàn)出高度分散化的特征。這個(gè)想法引人深思。

我強(qiáng)烈推薦大家閱讀你的文章，因?yàn)楫?dāng)你談“去美國(guó)化”時(shí)，如果只看標(biāo)題，很容易誤解為要與美國(guó)完全脫鉤。但我認(rèn)為你提出的這個(gè)區(qū)別非常重要，這確實(shí)有助于改善中美關(guān)系。非常感謝您抽出時(shí)間。

王文：謝謝迪森教授，我期待與您再次討論。

英文版對(duì)話內(nèi)容

Glenn Diesen:Welcome back. We are here with Professor Wang Wen, Professor and Dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China, also the Deputy Dean of the Silk Road School. So thank you very much for coming back.

I recently read one of your articles, which I found very interesting. That is, we have seen the U.S.-China relationship evolving for quite some time. For about 20, 30 years ago, it was very common to describe this mutual dependence between the United States and China.

But of course, what we have seen is that the U.S. has kept weaken in many indicators, meanwhile China kept getting stronger, and this has created mutual suspicions and fear.

They always say that if you owe someone $100, then you have a problem. But if you owe them a million then they have a problem. And I guess this is where we are going now.

And from 2008 to 2009, the relationship became more unstable following the global financial crisis, given that the U.S.-led financial system began to crack.

Now we see the U.S. being more worried about the rise of China. They talk about decoupling, de-risking, friend shoring, all of this. But of course, China has had to respond in some ways: considering how to reduce dependence on this relationship. In this regard, you wrote this article on the De-Americanization of China, which I found fascinating.

So, I thought a good place to start would be maybe if you can outline: what are the motivations for China to De-Americanization? And to what extent is it merely a response to American policy, or just addressing the realities of a new multi-polar distribution of power in which China simply cannot have all its eggs in the American basket?

Wang Wen:Thank you, Professor Diesen, so nice to meet you again. And also, I greatly appreciate and thank you for reading my work. My latest article was published inThe Diplomatlast month. Actually, over the past month, this article has generated great influence. A lot of American friends, even a few European friends, Japanese friends, and many international friends, they have all read this article, because its title is “China’s De-Americanization strategy”.

In this article I talk about six fields of China’s De-Americanization process over the past seven or eight years. These include the De-Americanization of trade, finance, security, ideology, high-tech and education. I listed a lot of data to show and prove my observations.

And as you asked, the so-called De-Americanization strategy is not something China proactively presumed, but rather something it was forced into by the United States.

In fact, since China’s reform and opening up in 1978, China has consistently sought to establish friendly relations with the U.S., adopting an open policy toward the U.S., attracting American investment, increasing trade with the U.S., and learning from the management experience of American companies and financial markets.

But I have to share with you a very horrible and very huge data: by 2016 about 20% of China foreign trade was dependent on the U.S. Frankly, I admit this dependence benefited China in the past. But soon after, during his first term, President Trump began implementing policy to contain China, launching a trade war against China, detaining Huawei’s Ms. Meng Wanzhou, and imposing sanctions on thousands of Chinese companies including Huawei.

And this containment policy made China feel threatened, promoting countermeasures and adjustments. And as I pointed out in an article published inThe New York Timesin August 2022, I said the Chinese people have now awakened and no longer hold the United States in such a high regard. The Chinese people increasingly believe that relying on the U.S. as they did in the past is dangerous. From this perspective, it was the United States that forced China to adopt the so-called De-Americanization strategy.

And I also wrote in another article this year that the Chinese people should actually thank Trump, because President Trump was like an excellent political education teacher: teaching Chinese people to see through American hypocrisy and the cruelty of the international community, and more importantly, teaching us how to take necessary countermeasures to defend our country’s core interests in the modernization process. So this is what I mean, the so-called De-Americanization.

Glenn Diesen:I think it’s important that scholars and politicians recognize that there will always be some competition between the great powers, and it’s important to be honest about this, because then you can identify where it’s possible to compromise, where one can harmonize interest and cooperate, while at the same time also recognizing that there will be competition.

So how can this be managed and mitigated, especially the hardest zero-sum aspects of this competition? And again, ideally make it friendly competition, as opposed to militarizing economic disputes.

But you know, if you look at the extreme economic concentration in the United States in the 1990s, globalization meant Americanization to a large extent. That is, we all used American technologies, industries, shipping corridors, banks and currency, and so on. So as the distribution of power shifts, it’s quite reasonable to assume that the relationships will have to change as well. It opens up areas of cooperation and competition.

So De-Americanization, I think, is a recognition of reality. But I did want to ask, as China now diversifies its trade away from the United States to become less dependent, what do you see as the larger consequences in terms of how the entire world or the international economic system is structured?

Wang Wen:Yeah, interesting and very important questions you’ve asked. In terms of my understanding, since China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has increasingly emphasized cooperation with countries in the Global South. The total bilateral trade between China and Russia, China and Central Asia, China and Latin America, China and Africa, China and Southeast Asia, has grown by more than 10% annually.

And meanwhile, total trade between China and the United States has seen a relative decline over the past decade. So this what I call De-Americanization, or structural adjustment. This has also led to China becoming less reliant on the U.S. in this trade relationship.

As you mentioned, for example, five years ago bilateral trade between China and Russia was only slightly over 100 billion U.S. dollars, but now five years later it has reached 250 billion U.S. dollars, and it is expected to exceed 300 billion U.S. dollars in the next five years. The bilateral trade between China and Latin America has already surpassed 500 billion U.S. dollars, and it’s likely to exceed the total trade between China and the U.S. in the next five years, because nowadays, this year, the bilateral trade between China and U.S. is only about 500 billion U.S. dollars.

So that means, in other words, in China’s foreign trade landscape, Latin America may become more important than the United States in the next five years. That I think is diversification. Therefore, in my view, the U.S. will still be a very important trading partner of China in the future, but its importance is declining.

The strategic result of China’s De-Americanization of trade is that China’s global trade structure has become more balanced and more secure. This is the key reason why China’s countermeasure against the U.S. trade war this year in 2025 was so successful, and why China is not afraid of the U.S. in the trade war. On the contrary, as many media outlets have reported, the U.S. has already lost the U.S.-China trade war of 2025. The main reason is that the U.S. share in China’s foreign trade landscape is declining. As I said, in 2015 U.S.-China trade accounted for about 20% of China’s total foreign trade, but now it is only 9%.

On the other hand, the re-balancing of China’s foreign trade structure is beneficial to the developing countries around the world. China has exported more high quality and affordable goods to the world, achieving De-Americanization of goods and De-Americanization of production, and helping developing countries in the Global South benefit from China’s development.

In the past, developing countries imported too many western products. Those products were of good quality, but too expensive. But now China has launched a price revolution in foreign trade, so Global South countries can buy more high-quality Chinese goods at same prices, thereby gaining more benefits. So that’s what I often said, the key reason why China’s rise is beneficial to the world.

In the past we often thought that “made in China” meant the quality was not very good and the price was low, but recently, currently, China’s production has become more and more high quality, right? For example, EV cars, solar production and electrical production. So that’s why I think China now has launched an international price revolution. This international price revolution I think is beneficial to the Global South countries.

Glenn Diesen:Very much so. China is diversifying away from dependence on the U.S., but De-Americanization doesn’t have to be anti-American.

I just got back from Wuhan, where I was giving some guest lectures at some universities in China, talking about Russian-Europe relations.

Wang Wen:You should come to Beijing. I missed you.

Glenn Diesen:I should have, yeah. But there was not enough time. Well, I was talking about Russian geo-economics, because on the same issue you’re speaking about now, diversification, the idea that if countries are partners that they don’t diversify, I think that is a delusion.

Again, for the Russians, I made the point that China is the most important partner, also for the development of a multi-polar system. But because the relations are asymmetrical, that is the Chinese economy is much much greater, this creates asymmetry, uneven dependence. Now this doesn’t have to be a problem on its own, but the Russians will likely then pursue strategic autonomy in key technological areas, so they have their own digital base, but also diversify by trading with India and other great powers. So again, China would be the main and most important partner, but again, no country puts all its eggs in one basket, which is why all countries seek to diversify.

And I think the recognition is important: it doesn’t have to be either pro or against. This is not how states and economies work. I think the same applies to the United States though, if they are worried about developing excessive dependence on China, Americans should ensure a high degree of technological sovereignty, not excessive dependence. But a trade war to break China? That’s not the same thing. That is destructive and dangerous. If the Chinese and Americans can sit down together, each side with areas where they want strategic autonomy, in technologies or industries, and come to some kind of trade agreement to manage the competition, then a lot of this can be handled. The idea that everything has to be zero-sum all the time, I think, is a mistake.

This does take me to my next question though. For many years China was a technological follower, trying to catch up with the United States. But now it’s essentially competing with the United States in terms of who’s the technological leader. How do you think or expect this will intensify into an unfriendly technological rivalry?

Wang Wen:Yeah, as you mentioned, nowadays in many views China’s high-tech production has caught up with that of the U.S. And I think this is a very good thing for China. Our confidence has recovered and risen up very quickly, because in the past seven years, when President Trump launched a high-tech war against China, containing Huawei and a lot others, I think this has been a very serious, very huge competition.

But in my opinion, the high-tech products are not exclusive to the United States. The U.S. cannot monopolize the research, development and production of all high-tech products. None should profit excessively from monopolizing high-tech. None should weaponize high-tech to suppress other countries, including China. So, I think competition in high-tech should be fair and market based.

As an emerging economy, China has achieved a technological breakthrough in more and more fields through continuously increasing in investment in research ond development and the technological environment. This is perfectly normal and perfectly successful. I think China has not stolen, not seized, not engaged in colonialism, so the U.S. has no reason to accuse China of being unfriendly or anything else.

Some voices I have heard in U.S. newspaper or U.S. media claim that China is stealing American technology. I think this view is also unfair. Let me give you a very interesting example in history, everyone knows the compass and gunpowder were invented in China more than 1000 years ago, and later the U.S. and western countries adopted these inventions and propelled the technological revolution. China didn’t accuse the U.S. for stealing China’s technology in the ancient age, right?

Similarly, China is now innovating based on existing American high-tech products and technology, even surpassing the U.S. in areas such as high-speed railway infrastructure, EV cars, and solar energy. This is process that benefits humanity and promotes the development of human civilization. So, I believe that the current high-tech competition between China and the U.S. is normal. Chinese scientists are adopting to this competition, and Chinese social scientists are also viewing this competition rationally. We should not judge its competition through an ideological lens.

The U.S. should not use political means, especially financial sanctions, extraterritorial jurisdiction and technological blockades, to respond to China’s technological competition. On the contrary, I think the U.S. should embrace this technological competition with a more open mindset. I think the technological competition should be healthy. The results of the technological competition between the U.S. and China, I think, will ultimately benefit all of humanity, if we engage in rational competition in high-tech.

Glenn Diesen:I think that’s a resonant point. Technologies do spread; they’re supposed to spread. Of course this can be very positive as well. I would even say that if the competition between the United States and China is managed in a good manner, it could be very good for the world actually.

Because when you have only one center of power, one dominant state that controls technologies, it has the ability to slow down their proliferation, to make sure that technologies do not spread fast. In other words, they can extend this first-mover advantage of the innovator. However, once you have two or more technological leaders, there’s a tendency for technology to spread much faster, because whoever wants to essentially appeal to the wider world, must offer incentives such as technological transfer.

You see this now with the recent Russia-India partnership in the military technologies, the Russians are willing to transfer a lot of technologies to India, so the Indians prefer the Russians over Western suppliers. Of course, one could argue weapon technologies are not always great to spread, but overall, the spread of technologies should be seen as something creates more equality or equity around the world.

But I do think what’s panicking the U.S. though is that realistically, they can’t compete properly with China anymore. And I think it’s this fear that it’s not stable that they’re falling behind. Their rent-seeking economy makes it very expensive to produce things, and also because China is such a massive industrial powerhouse, it can implement new technologies like AI on a massive scale and make money.

I think the U.S., in its panic over competition with China, has pumped a lot of money into areas like artificial intelligence, leading to malinvestments and a massive AI bubble. And now they don’t have the same ability to make that money back. So now we end up in this situation where the U.S. government accuses China of having state-managed capitalism, yet the U.S. government is taking ownership stakes in tech companies. So, you know, there is not that much consistency, but it is interesting where this competition goes. My point is that it can have both benefits and disadvantages.

But I also wanted to move on to the financial area, because you also wrote about De-Americanization in the financial space, how China can diversify away from the U.S. financial instruments of power. There’s always an interest. Many people assume that the Chinese just want to get rid of the dollar. But to what extent do you think China still has an incentive of using the dollar for its own interest?

Wang Wen:Yes, it’s very important for De-Americanization in the financial sector. I don’t know whether you know that in the past seven years, over 2000 Chinese companies have been subjected to U.S. financial sanctions. These financial sanctions are illegal and have only increased resentment among Chinese people towards U.S. financial hegemony, promoting them to seek effective ways to circumvent these sanctions.

On the other hand, China takes more countermeasures to make U.S. pay the necessary price for its financial sanctions, thereby defending China’s national interests. China is also reducing its reliance on the U.S. dollar, adopting more de-dollarization measures in bilateral trade and cooperation with other countries, and promoting reforms of the international financial payment system. This is less a countermeasure against the U.S., but more an action forced upon China to defend its own interests.

Everyone knows that the current dollar hegemony is more detrimental than beneficial to the world. Yes, I admit after the end of World War II, dollar hegemony did have its contributions, playing a certain role in international financial stability. But now it seems that dollar hegemony is the biggest obstacle to the reform of the existing international financial, economic and trade system. The whole world should reduce its reliance on the U.S. dollar to reduce financial risks and the risks of being subjected to dollar sanctions.

Just now you mentioned about the Russian issues. If you ask the Russian people, every Russian will answer you that we need to reduce financial dependence on the U.S., because the U.S. uses the financial weapon to deter Russia, right?

So, I believe in the future, the diversification of the international finance and monetary system will be more conducive to the economic development and social stability of various countries. So, I predict that by 2035, dollar hegemony will further crumble, and the internationalization of the RMB and of other currencies will continue to increase, and more and more countries will reduce their reliance on the U.S. dollar. I think this is the necessary trend for the future.

Glenn Diesen:It’s interesting you mentioned all these illegal sanctions, because there’s a common argument in the literature that a declining hegemon will always face a dilemma, that is how does it transition or what does it do now? Because on one hand, it can facilitate a transition to a multi-polar system and preserve financial stability, or alternatively it can try to hold on to its hegemonic position by sanctioning rising powers, essentially weaponizing their dependence on its financial instruments of power. But then it will only encourage the rest of the world to decouple faster.

And they mentioned Russia because Putin made this comment, we never actually implemented a policy of decoupling from the dollar; it was America that decoupled us from the dollar; you’re the one forcing this through. But even if the sanctions end tomorrow, the Russians will never again trust Western currencies, Western banks, Western payment systems, insurance systems, or any of the sort. So, it is very destructive that the U.S. went with the second path.

I think it’s somewhat human nature. Perhaps nobody likes to see their hegemony go away, and they want to preserve it. But I think now the scale of self-harm is dangerous, because the De-Americanization of China could have been a mild rebalancing, but instead now we’re going to possibly see China treating dollar and U.S. banks as threats to avoid at all costs, which is hard to see as in the U.S. interest.

Let me ask you though, you define this De-Americanization as building up a China model as an alternative. Can you unpack this? What does it entail?

Wang Wen:I think in fact, that the process of the rest countries developing their own development model, because you mentioned the West, can be seen as De-Americanization. Because as we all know, for the past half century most countries’ modernization process have been modeled after the United States. The late Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington wrote that since the 1970s, human political development has entered a third wave. And another very famous professor, Francis Fukuyama, spoke about the end of history. Both of them were referring to the convergence of many countries’ model towards the American development model.

Of course we admire America, we worship the American development model. But the problem is that during the 2008 international financial crisis, especially since Trump took office in 2017, people around the world have been re-evaluating their developmental paths and readjusting their relationships with the United States. For example, emerging economies such as Russia, Brazil, India, Indonesia are all re-examining their national development positioning and identity. These countries are seeking to defend their national security and pursue their own development paths in areas such as political development models, economic market mechanisms, financial instruments and military security systems. I think China is no exception.

First, China must ensure the security of its political system. China does not want to repeat the path of Soviet Union’s collapse. China will not allow the United States to instigate a color revolution in China. Over the past 20 years, many countries in the world have experienced color revolutions linked to the United States.

Secondly, China must also ensure its economic, trade and financial autonomy, preventing the United States from controlling China’s economic lifeline. In fact, many countries’ economies are controlled by the United States due to excessive dependence on it, especially some countries in Latin America. This can be called new colonialism.

Thirdly, I think China must pursue its own technological and military security. China must prevent the U.S. from stifling its technological and military development, and posing threats in the long term. And also, China has to promote its reunification. We have to solve the Taiwan issues in the coming years. And finally, China must have its own independent knowledge and ideology system, to prevent being colonized by the American ideology and knowledge. And of course, this De-Americanization process does not mean completely decoupling from the United States, but rather about finding a normal relationship with the U.S.: neither completely dependent on U.S., nor avoiding necessary cooperation.

I can give you a very interesting example. I don’t know whether it is right. In the past, the China-U.S. relationship was like that of close lovers, especially in 1980s, 1990s, and the early 2000s. After September 11, China supported the U.S. in its anti-terrorism war and the two countries shared a very good relationship. Even during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the U.S. President came to Beijing and celebrated the Olympics with the Chinese President. That was a very good relationship many, many years ago, almost like that of close lovers.

But in the future, I hope that China-U.S. relationship will be like that of normal neighbors. Neighbors who may have some kind of conflict, but they also interact; and when faced with common difficulties, they help each other. So, I think the bottom line is that the military conflict between the U.S. and China must be avoided at all costs, as it would benefit no one. In the future, the U.S.-China relationship will be back to normal.

Glenn Diesen: I like that analogy and you hear it often in political science, the marriage to neighbor analogy. It’s a good analogy. I like it because often especially with great powers, if they are too close to each other, it could create too much tension to the point it doesn’t work anymore. But if they get some distance from each other, they’re unable to live as a married couple, but they’re able to be good neighbors, and often this divorce without the decoupling is quite favorable. And I think for great powers like China and the U.S., where there will always be some suspicion, no one gains from open hostilities, that it’s better to have a bit of De-Americanization.

Well, you can say the Russians are doing the same now, they held the goal of being in a common Europe with Europeans, but I think it created too much tension, so they now see that a divorce is better. They would rather try to be neighbors instead of aspiring for something more. On color revolutions, I think this is an important part of what resisting “Americanization” should mean, because those revolutions have created many problems around the world, especially in Europe. This is not to say it is a conspiracy, but what the Americans have done is to say that democracy has to include a strong civil society, one capable of self-organization independent of the government, which is also fair enough. But then they said those who should organize civil society are NGOs, more specifically, American NGOs, being even more specifically, state-financed NGOs. These are NGOs financed by the U.S. government and linked to U.S. intelligence agencies, which for some reason are supposed to organize Chinese civil society. I mean, this is crazy stuff. Imagine if the Chinese government in cooperation with its intelligence services attempted to organize civil society in America, I can imagine there would be some pushback. Indeed, the evidence is already there: in 1983, President Reagan and the director of the CIA began to set up NGOs like the National Endowment for Democracy as a way of manipulating and controlling civil society in other countries. So, you don’t have to conquer countries with military, you can just take over their civil society. This is a massive problem, one of the reasons why we now have war in Europe as well.

My last question, given that we are both academics, is how does education fit within this De-Americanization initiative? How is education De-Americanized?

Wang Wen:As I mentioned just now, a lot of very interesting concepts, such as so-called democracy and civil society. In the past, we admired those terms very much, but now we have certainly woken up. Those terms so-called civil society, democracy are all very American style. They have very special American meaning. So that’s why back to your last question about education, now Chinese education also needs to maintain a normal relationship with the United States.

Nowadays we are promoting China’s knowledge and textbook autonomy. Especially in the past five years we have produced more and more China-authored textbooks, in political science, economics, finance, sociology, law, and similar fields.

And even worse, another very terrible thing, over the past 30 years, nearly 1 million young Chinese people have studied abroad every year, and more than 40% of them went to the United States. Many of them were among the best and most clever students in Chinese universities. After earning their master’s or doctoral degrees in the United States, many choose to stay there and serve the U.S.

We all know one very interesting data: more than 30% of AI scientists in Silicon Valley have their undergraduate degrees from China. So, I sometimes joke that over the past seven or eight years we have a very serious China-U.S. high-tech war, but this so-called high-tech war between China and the U.S. is essentially a war between Chinese people in China and Chinese people in the United States. So, this is also abnormal.

So therefore, you mentioned the De-Americanization of education, it means bringing China’s education development back to a normal condition, and maintaining a normal development. We certainly support young Chinese people studying in the U.S., and we welcome American students to study in China. However, this kind of exchange cannot evolve into excessive dependence.

So now President Trump is refusing more Chinese students from studying in the United States, and prohibiting Chinese students from studying STEM subjects in the U.S. I have to say "thank you". Thank you, President Trump. No problem. More distinguished Chinese students stay in the Chinese universities and serve China in the future. So, from this perspective, both China and the United States are seeking a new educational position under new historical conditions. I think this new positioning of bilateral relationship will be beneficial to the future development of both countries.

In short, back to your question: Chinese education must also follow its own path. China has to have its own knowledge system and ideological system, disciplinary system, textbook system and theoretical system, and cultivate more high quality and high-level talents who truly serve China, instead of sending many high level and high-quality talents to United States and to serve the U.S. I think this is the education new normal.

I really appreciate Professor Diesen to give me this opportunity to explain deeply about De-Americanization. I emphasize again, De-Americanization is not equal to decoupling from U.S. De-Americanization just means that we will be back to a normal relationship with America. We don’t want to be dependent on U.S. as in the past. I think this normal relationship with the U.S. will be beneficial for each other. That is my key point. Thank you again.

Glenn Diesen:Thank you, and the brain drain you refer to is interesting, because many countries have experienced this, the best and brightest often go abroad for better opportunities, but as the opportunities at home increase, more stay of course.

But now, with discrimination against Chinese scholars, not just scholars, also professionals, are essentially leaving America in huge numbers, going back to China, this reverse brain drain now is turning out to be quite beneficial for China, which is getting a lot of excellent and well experienced professionals back.

What you mean by “not de-coupling,” but “De-Americanization” is actually diversification. I think this could be a positive development for the world. You could argue that having multiple centers of power, pluralism instead of universalism, enables the international system to absorb more shocks. Indeed, from ancient Greece to establishment of America itself, it was largely based on this idea as well.

Like in ancient Greece, all these different city states would experiment with different forms of government, education, economy, and whoever did things successfully, others might emulate them, but then you learn from each other; you don’t try to put everyone into one box. The U.S. as well embraced this concept through its state system initially. And I know China does seem similar now, very decentralized economically. It’s a fascinating idea.

I would encourage everyone to read your article, because when you say De-Americanization, if you just read headlines, it almost seems as if we’re going to decouple from America. But I think it’s a very important distinction you draw, which indeed could improve relations between China and America as well. As always, thank you very much for taking the time.

WangWen:Thank you, Professor Diesen. I look forward to discussing with you again.

中國(guó)人民大學(xué)全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力學(xué)院是中國(guó)高校第一所全球領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力學(xué)院。學(xué)院以“面向全球”“面向一流”“面向未來(lái)”為發(fā)展定位，以中外學(xué)生為培養(yǎng)對(duì)象，旨在培養(yǎng)更多符合時(shí)代需求、世界需求、中國(guó)需求的全球未來(lái)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人和青年領(lǐng)袖。

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